Who should make corporate law? : EC legislation versus regulatory competition by Armour, John
 
 
 
JOHN ARMOUR 
 
WHO SHOULD MAKE CORPORATE LAW? 
EC LEGISLATION VERSUS REGULATORY COMPETITION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 41  
 
PROF. DR. THEODOR BAUMS 
PROF. DR. ANDREAS CAHN 
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
SENCKENBERGANLAGE 31 
D-60054 FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
TEL: +49 (0)69 / 798-28941 
FAX: +49 (0)69 / 798-29018 
(INTERNET: HTTP://WWW.ILF-FRANKFURT.DE) 
  
 
 
 
John Armour 
Who Should Make Corporate Law?  
EC Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Law and Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 41 
11/ 2005 Who Should Make Corporate Law? 
EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition 
 
 
John Armour 
 
Faculty of Law and Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University 
 
 
This version 20 June 2005  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through 
regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally 
possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to 
govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this 
freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their 
company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most 
successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate 
governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in 
specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate 
as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will 
direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the 
welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the 
‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would 
better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.  
 
 
Keywords: European law, company law, regulatory competition, corporate insolvency, 
Centros, Inspire Art. 
JEL Codes:  G34, H73, K22 
 
 Who Should Make Corporate Law? 
EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition 
 
John Armour
* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The beginning of the twenty-first century has brought with it an extraordinary set of 
stimuli for company law reform in the EU. A series of well-publicised recent scandals on 
both sides of the Atlantic have shaken faith in existing company law frameworks. 
Contemporaneously, in the wake of the ECJ’s decisions in the Centros line of cases,
1 EU 
Member States are, for the first time, seemingly on the threshold of regulatory 
competition over the content of company law. The result has been protracted debates 
about the optimal ‘model’ for company law, informing an unprecedented volume of 
reform activity, both at EU and Member State level. A logically prior question concerns 
the allocation of jurisdiction to make the relevant reforms across the vertical, or ‘federal’, 
dimension—as between the EU and Member States.
2 This question is the subject of the 
current paper.  
The analysis begins from the starting point that, given diversity amongst firms 
and national systems of corporate governance, a federal legislator cannot be sure which, 
if any, regulatory measures will be optimal. The paper’s basic argument is that regulatory 
                                                 
* Faculty of Law and Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge. This paper is based on the 
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208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) [2002] ECR I-
9919; Case C-167/01, Kamel van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR 
I-10155. 
2 There is a second dimension, which may be termed the horizontal, or domestic, aspect. This concerns the 
selection of the appropriate body, within a given jurisdiction, for formulating the rules that govern the 
operation of corporate enterprise: namely, legislators, judges, regulators or private parties. 
  1competition between Member States’ company laws is likely to be a better way stimulate 
the development of appropriate legal rules than is the European legislative process.  
Whilst the theoretical possibilities for regulatory competition are now fairly well 
understood, a number of commentators have argued either it is unlikely to be a significant 
force in Europe, or that if it is, it may be of the pathological, ‘race to the bottom’, 
variety.
3 My basic argument is that regulatory competition is likely to be both a 
significant and a beneficial mechanism for the development of European company law. A 
recurring theme will be that national diversity implies that the process will operate 
differently from the way it has done in the US: whilst there will be regulatory 
competition, no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done.  
This argument will be developed in three stages. First, I will suggest that the EU 
is rapidly moving towards a framework within which companies will be both willing and 
able to locate their registered offices so as to secure a company law that is favourable to 
their requirements. For ‘start-up’ enterprises, this follows in the wake of recent landmark 
ECJ cases, and is motivated by entrepreneurs’ desire to avoid barriers to entry created by 
capital maintenance rules. Moreover, it seems likely that EC legislation will soon also 
permit established companies to change their registered offices. For these firms, arbitrage 
will plausibly be motivated by a desire to ensure an appropriate ‘fit’ between ownership 
structure and the applicable governance regime. Most specifically, continental European 
companies which wish to shift from concentrated to dispersed ownership may find 
reincorporation in the UK to be an attractive option. 
Secondly, I will argue that some Member States, and in particular the UK, will 
have incentives to engage in regulatory competition to attract companies, or to prevent 
them from being attracted elsewhere. For the UK, this will not be driven by tax revenues, 
as is the motivation for Delaware, but rather by professional services firms facing an 
increasingly competitive global environment. Other Member States are likely to respond 
                                                 
3 See, eg,  L. Enriques, ‘EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware’ (2004) 15 EBL Rev 
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  2with ‘defensive’ competition, either by removing inefficient rules or by further 
developing the complementarities of their systems. In the case of ‘start-up’ companies, 
recent and proposed legislative changes to European capital maintenance regimes provide 
evidence that this is already taking place.  
My third claim is that the European regulatory competition will not result in a 
destructive ‘race to the bottom’. In particular, proposed EU legislation governing the 
process by which established companies will be able to change their registered offices 
will give affected constituencies the ability to influence the outcome, so that arbitrage 
will be motivated by a desire to increase total value rather than the private interests of one 
group. The only way Member States will succeed in attracting such companies will be 
through providing company laws which enhance firm value. National legislators will 
therefore have incentives to engage in mutual learning: generally (sub)optimal rules will 
come to be (discarded) adopted; at the same time, particular national specialisations will 
tend to be enhanced. 
Finally, I will extend the argument, rather more tentatively, to the case of 
corporate insolvency law. The better view is that Member States will not be able to 
preserve restrictive creditor protection rules from scrutiny under EC free movement law 
merely by recharacterising them as insolvency law, rather than company law. Moreover, I 
will suggest that the framework of the European Insolvency Regulation could permit a 
degree of regulatory competition to take place over aspects of corporate insolvency law—
in particular, the nature of any ‘corporate rescue’ proceedings that may be available. It is 
sensible to consider their selection as part and parcel of the company law arbitrage, 
because there may be complementarities between the two.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two sets the scene for the 
analysis by considering the scope of ‘company law’, the rationale for EU company law 
legislation, and the mechanisms of regulatory competition. Section three contains the 
basic argument and section four is the extension to corporate insolvency. Section five 
concludes with the suggestion that regulatory competition is likely to be superior than EC 
legislation for all aspects of company law on which there is no EU-wide consensus as to 
the appropriate regulatory choices. 
 
  32. Setting the Scene 
WHAT IS ‘COMPANY LAW’, AND WHAT DOES IT DO? 
In order to make sense of the issues, it is necessary to begin with a working definition of 
‘company law’. From a traditional domestic perspective, this may be thought to be 
obvious: namely that which is found in the companies legislation. Yet from a European 
perspective, this traditional answer is unsatisfactory, because the scope of ‘company law’ 
is understood differently in different jurisdictions.
4 It is therefore helpful to begin with a 
framework that is neutral across jurisdictions. For this purpose, a functionalist approach 
is useful. 
A functionalist account of a particular set of legal rules or legal institutions 
focuses on the purposes served for society by the institution in question. Company law’s 
role is to regulate and facilitate the operation of business firms. Thus, a functionalist 
explanation of the subject seeks to explain how the rules in question do this. A leading 
functionalist account of corporate law views the subject as doing two basic things:
5 
establishing the structure of the corporate form (and in particular, property rules which 
partition corporate assets from the assets of individuals associated with the company),
6 
and seeking to prevent opportunism within voluntary relationships between participants. 
All company laws view ‘participants’ as including shareholders and directors; most 
include, to some extent, creditors, and some—the German system, for example—also 
include employees.
7  
                                                 
4 On differences in the scope of company law in other jurisdictions, see R. Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 15-17. The proper scope of the subject has been extensively debated 
at the domestic level in the course of the UK’s recent Company Law Review. See, e.g., Company Law 
Review Steering Group (‘CLSRG’), The Strategic Framework, URN 99/654 (London: DTI, 1999), 33-55; 
CLSRG, Final Report, Vol I, URN 01/942 (London: DTI, 2001), 41. See also DTI, Company Law Reform, 
Cm 6456 (London: TSO, 2005), 10. 
5 Kraakman et al, ibid., 1-31. 
6 See also H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The Essential Role of Organisational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale LJ 
387; J. Armour and M.J. Whincop, ‘The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law’, ESRC Centre for 
Business Research Working Paper 299 (2005). 
7 See generally Kraakman et al,  supra n 4, 61-7. On employees, see H. Gospel and A. Pendleton, 
‘Corporate Governance and Labour Management—An International Comparison’ in Gospel and Pendleton 
(eds.), Corporate Governance and Labour Management (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 1. 
  4Thus company law establishes a fund of corporate property, and provides a set of 
rules to govern the voluntary arrangements between the individuals associated with the 
business. A contentious question at the level of domestic corporate law is whether the 
rules governing the ‘terms’ of these relationships—that is, the rules that seek to minimise 
opportunistic conduct—are adequate. The debate typically turns on whether such rules 
should be mandatory in their content, or whether ‘default’ terms will suffice, and in either 
case, what the preferred content of the rule should be.
8 In relation to each of the axes 
along which the law has an impact—shareholder-creditor, director-shareholder, 
shareholder-employee, and so on, it is possible to find a welter of academic and political 
opinion in either direction.
9 Moreover, it seems highly plausible that for any given 
regulatory issue, there may be no single ‘best’ approach for all European systems. 
Company law’s regulatory choices are complementary to other aspects of a corporate 
governance system and of the regulation of the economy more generally—including tax, 
labour, competition and pension regulation and corporate ownership structure. The 
diversity of national corporate governance regimes,
10 coupled with such 
complementarities, implies that different legal rules are likely to be best for different 
                                                 
8 See generally, F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and 
Operation  (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 126-262. 
9 For an impressionistic introduction, see (i) on manager-shareholder conflicts, P.A. Gompers et al, 
‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices’, NBER Working Paper No 8449 (2001) (weaker shareholder 
rights imply reduced performance); cf. D.F. Larcker et al, ‘How Important is Corporate Governance?’ 
Wharton School Working Paper (2004) (corporate governance indicators poor explanators of performance); 
(ii) on shareholder-creditor conflicts, R. La Porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52 
Journal of Finance 1131 (relationship between debt finance and creditor protection ambiguous); Kraakman 
et al,  supra  n 4, 77-96 (different systems of creditor protection); and (iii) on employee-shareholder 
conflicts, B. Frick and E. Lehmann, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany: Ownership, Codetermination and 
Firm Performance in a Stakeholder Economy’ in Gospel and Pendleton (eds.), supra n 7, 122, 133-4 
(evidence on codetermination inconclusive).  
10 See O. Fioretos, ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the European Community’ in  P.A. Hall and D. Soskice 
(eds.), Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 213-246; W. Carlin and C. Mayer, ‘How do Financial 
Systems Affect Economic Performance?’ in J.A. McCahery et al (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes: 
Convergence and Diversity (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 325, 334-6. 
  5systems.
11 For the purposes of this paper, we need not engage in seeking answers for 
these debates, but may simply ensure that we keep their existence in mind by adopting, as 
an heuristic device, a perspective of ‘regulatory agnosticism’: that is, we can be sure of 
the desirability of neither rule nor content in any given case. 
 
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 
The European Community was established with the goal, inter alia, of forming a 
genuinely common market between Member States. This entailed the removal of barriers 
to trade and competition, and of other less direct distortions.
12 The variety of different 
national solutions to the questions of company law formed the original impetus for the 
European company law programme.
13 In particular, there was concern that different 
national law structures might encourage harmful regulatory arbitrage, whereby 
companies were given incentives to relocate their operations or legal personality in other 
jurisdictions, not for sound economic reasons, but simply to avoid complying with 
domestic rules of company law. The plethora of different national law rules leads to a 
further distorting effect: namely, the increased transaction costs incurred by companies 
and their advisers when doing cross-border deals involving aspects of company law (for 
example, corporate finance or inward investment). The solution was to press for 
‘harmonization’ of national laws so as to minimise these costs.  
The early years of the European project saw a consensus that the solution to these 
distorting effects of differences in national company law systems was to be found in the 
‘federal’ (that is, EC-level) prescription of company law rules, which would ensure 
                                                 
11 See R.H. Schmidt and G. Spindler, ‘Path Dependence and Complementarity in Corporate Governance’ in 
J.N. Gordon and M.J. Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2004), 114-26; B. Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 54-66. 
12 See Preamble and Arts. 2, 3 EC; C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), 6 (citing Comité Intergouvernemental Créé par la Conférence de Messina, Rapport 
des Chefs de Délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, Brussels, 21 April 1956 (the ‘Spaak 
Report’) Mae 120 f/56, 14). 
13 V. Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 3-5.  
  6mutual compatibility.
14 This technique was employed in the early company law 
harmonisation efforts, such as the First and Second Company Law Directives on 
safeguards for third parties and share capital respectively.
15 As the European project has 
evolved, political consensus has become harder to find, with the result that progress has 
only been possible in the company law legislative programme by first focusing on 
specific areas.
16 From the early 1990s onwards, a range of less intensive techniques 
started to be employed, such as so-called ‘framework’ measures, which specify only 
general principles and leave Member States to specify the details at a later date. These 
less prescriptive measures have the manifest benefit of permitting greater adherence to 
the principle of subsidiarity, as well as being more politically feasible. The most 
interesting recent developments include the provision of a ‘menu’ of federal rules (as 
with the Takeover Directive),
17 and the ‘comitology’ process of devolution of legislative 
competence to a committee of experts in relation to securities regulation.
18 A third, and 
even less prescriptive form of approximation, is what has been termed ‘procedural’ 
harmonization.
19 This involves rules which, rather than seek to impose substantive 
solutions on Member States, aim instead to govern or influence the process by which 
legislation is passed. 
In the wake of a series of high-profile corporate collapses, the European 
                                                 
14 See H.C. Ficker, ‘The EEC Directives on Company Law Harmonization’ in C.M. Schmitthoff (ed.), The 
Harmonization of European Company Law (London: UNCCL, 1973), 66. 
15 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC [1968] OJ L 65/8; Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC [1977] OJ 
L26/1.   
16 See J. Wouters, ‘European Company Law: Quo Vadis?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 257, 268-76; S. 
Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Company Law: From Crisis to Boom’ (2004) 5 EBOR 601; J.A. 
McCahery and E.P.M. Vermeulen, ‘Does the European Company Prevent the “Delaware-effect”?’ (2005) 
TILEC Discussion Paper 2005-010, 10-18. 
17 Directive 2004/25/EC [2004] OJ L142/12.  See J.A. McCahery and G. Hertig, ‘Company and Takeover 
Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?’, ECGI Law 
Working Paper No 12/2003. 
18 See E. Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 58-126. 
19 S. Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in European Company Law’ in D. Esty and 
D. Gerardin (eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 190, 209-13. 
  7Commission announced in the summer of 2003 an ‘Action Plan’ for company law reform 
in Europe.
20 Much of the programme consists of measures for updating earlier EC 
legislation, but it contains a limited number of proposals for further substantive 
harmonisation. Most interesting for present purposes is the Commission’s explicit 
recognition of the importance of national diversity, and the championing as part of the 
reform programme of measures which will allow companies to increase their 
jurisdictional mobility.
21 These measures, which will stimulate regulatory competition, 
can be understood as a form of procedural harmonisation—that is, regulation intended to 
influence indirectly the way in which Member States legislate by establishing an orderly 
framework within which regulatory competition can take place.  
 
REGULATORY COMPETITION  
As a third ‘building block’ for the argument that follows, we shall now consider what is 
meant by ‘regulatory competition’. This may seem an obvious point, but it is one that is 
frequently misunderstood, or at least is used in different senses in different contexts. A 
brief scene-setting exercise may therefore be helpful.   
Regulatory competition implies that national legislatures compete to attract firms 
to operate subject to their laws.
22 The preconditions for this occurring are as follows. 
First, firms must engage in regulatory arbitrage: that is, they select the law that governs 
their activities in a way that will minimise their costs of operation. In turn, this implies 
that firms are permitted to do so, and that the costs of switching jurisdictions are less than 
the savings thereby achieved. Secondly, even if such arbitrage occurs, for regulatory 
competition to follow, individual jurisdictions must have something to gain (lose) by 
                                                 
20 EC Commission, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union - A Plan to Move Forward COM (2003) 284 final, Brussels 21.5.2003. See also K. Hopt, ‘Modern 
Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After Enron’ (2003) 3 
JCLS 221. 
21 EC Commission, ibid.  
22 See generally, Esty and Gerardin (eds.), supra  n 19; D.D. Murphy, The Structure of Regulatory 
Competition (Oxford: OUP, 2004). The classic model of regulatory competition responding to arbitrage by 
regulated parties is due to Tiebout: C. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 Journal 
of Political Economy 416. 
  8firms (not) conducting business subject to their laws. If both conditions are met, then 
jurisdictions will seek to enact laws designed to encourage firms to ‘use’ their 
regulations, as opposed to those in other jurisdictions. The key point is that the law 
reform process will come to be driven, at least in part, by the preferences of firms that are 
subject to the regulation in question. 
Applied to company law, regulatory competition can operate with respect to the 
law governing a company’s internal affairs, the so-called lex societatis, where firms are 
able to select this freely as between different jurisdictions. The US experience in this 
regard forms a well-known example.
23 It is worth considering in a little detail the 
institutional foundations of this case study. First, arbitrage. Federal conflicts rules rely on 
a ‘place of incorporation’ connecting factor in relation to the ‘internal affairs’ of a 
corporation, whereby a US corporation’s governance arrangements will be subject to the 
law of the state where it was formed. Moreover, almost all US states permit corporations 
(i) to reincorporate ‘inwards’ from another jurisdiction and (ii) to reincorporate 
‘outwards’ in favour of another jurisdiction. These rules combine to permit a corporate 
entity to reincorporate in State B and have the laws of that state govern its internal affairs, 
even though the entirety of its business is physically located in State A, and its only 
connection with State B is incorporation there. It is not costly for firms to reincorporate, 
and a significant number of firms have chosen to do so, almost all in favour of the same 
jurisdiction: Delaware.
24  
Secondly, competition. Delaware is a small state, which derives a significant 
proportion of its tax revenues from charges levied on the grant of corporate charters.
25 It 
does not prohibit companies from switching out of Delaware once they have chosen to 
                                                 
23 See generally R. Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1993); 
R. Drury, ‘A European Look at the American Experience of the Delaware Syndrome’ (2005) 5 JCLS 1. 
24 See, e.g., R. Romano, ‘Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle’ (1985) 1 J L Econ & 
Org 225, 244 (82% of reincorporating firms chose Delaware); C. Alva, ‘Delaware and the Market for 
Corporate Charters: History and Agency’ (1990) 15 Del J Corp L 885, 887 (over 40% of NYSE listed firms 
and over 50% of Fortune 500 firms incorporated in Delaware). 
25 W.L. Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware’ (1974) 88 Yale LJ 663, 664; 
Romano, supra n 23, 15-16; cf. M. Kahan and E. Kamar, ‘The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law’ (2002) 55 Stanf L Rev 679, 687-94. 
  9establish their registered office, should Delaware law cease to be attractive. Moreover, 
there is no viable alternative source of revenue to replace the charter dollars. Romano 
argues that the state’s willingness to render itself vulnerable to the loss of this revenue, 
should it cease to satisfy its corporate ‘customers’ is part of its initial attractiveness. This 
is thus a ‘hostage’ given to them in order to signal Delaware’s willingness to engage in 
continuous reform to its corporate law so as to reflect the preferences of firms that have 
incorporated there.
26 In addition, the Delaware bar are said to enjoy substantial revenues 
from the work they do in relation to firms incorporated in that state. As a well-organised 
and influential lobby-group, their concerns are thought to be taken seriously by the 
Delaware legislature.
27 
The process of regulatory competition is viewed with suspicion by some, who 
label it pejoratively as a ‘race for the bottom’.
28 Indeed, the desire to avoid such an 
outcome was one of the original rationales for the European company law harmonization 
project.
29 It is easy to show why this might be the case if it is assumed first that a 
particular variety of regulation is unequivocally in the public interest and, secondly, that 
compliance imposes a net private cost on regulated firms. If regulatory arbitrage occurs 
along the margin of minimisation of private costs by regulated firms, then regulatory 
competition will undermine the ability of such regulations to further the public interest.  
However, both assumptions are unrealistic when applied to company law. First,  
‘regulatory agnosticism’ implies that we cannot be sure about the relationship between 
regulatory provisions and the public interest.
30  Secondly, regulations which further the 
public interest will not necessarily impose net private costs on firms. In particular, 
regulations that seek to correct a market failure may, if they work effectively, result in a 
                                                 
26 Romano, supra n 23, 38. 
27 J. Macey and G.P. Miller, ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law’ (1987) 65 Tex 
L Rev 469, 472; Romano, supra n 23, 28-31; R. Daines, ‘The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms’ (2002) 
77 NYU L Rev 1559; cf. Kahan and Kamar, ibid., 694-700. 
28 The phrase was first coined in relation to corporate law by Bill Cary, lamenting the ‘Delaware effect’ in 
the US: Cary, supra n 25, 666. 
29 Edwards, supra n 13, 3. 
30 See supra, text to nn 9-11. 
  10net benefit to firms that comply. This will be felt through the price mechanism of the 
market in question. For example, measures designed to ameliorate the costs of 
information asymmetries between shareholders and managers (‘agency costs’) may result 
in firms being able to lower their costs of corporate finance.
31 Where regulation seeks to 
correct market failure, and if the federal legislature has no privileged knowledge as to the 
‘best’ type of regulation, then regulatory competition can act as a ‘race to the top’. Under 
these assumptions, the ‘market’ for the regulatory provisions can act, in the fashion 
celebrated by Hayek, to stimulate innovation and to aggregate the information available 
to firms about regulatory effectiveness.
32 Similarly, if diversity of systems means that 
there is no global ‘best’ regulatory choice, but rather simply locally-optimal solutions, 
then a ‘market’ for regulatory provisions may result in greater specialisation, if states 
perceive the best way to attract incorporations as being to capitalise on 
complementarities.
33 Again, innovation and mutual learning may be expected. Under 
these preconditions, then, regulatory competition can promote the beneficial development 
of national company laws where a federal legislator is faced with regulatory agnosticism. 
The crucial precondition for beneficial regulatory competition is that the price 
mechanism operate as a binding constraint on firms’ choices. An extended and ultimately 
inconclusive debate on this point has taken place in relation to the case of Delaware. 
Critics of the US system point to the fact that reincorporation decisions are typically 
taken by a simple majority shareholder vote, responding to an agenda which will have 
been put forward by the board of directors.
34 Therefore, they suggest that there may be a 
tendency for companies to tend to select corporate laws that favour managers, for 
                                                 
31 R.K. Winter, ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation’ (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 
251; Romano, supra n 24; Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n 8, 212-27. 
32 See Deakin, supra n 19, 216-17; R. Romano, ‘The States as Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters’, ECGI Law Working Paper No 34/2005. 
33 See S. Choi, ‘Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets’ (2002) 80 Tex 
L Rev 1657, 1705-6; K. Heine and W. Kerber, ‘European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and 
Path Dependence’ (2002) 13 Eur JL & Econ 47. 
34 See eg, L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law’ (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 1435. 
  11example through permitting the use of defensive tactics following hostile takeover bids.  
The empirical literature has, however, not given strong support to the critics’ 
claims. A number of studies have reported that reincorporation in Delaware appears to 
have a positive impact on a firm’s stock price, suggesting that the move is viewed by the 
market as value-increasing.
35 Others have sought to examine factors which determine a 
decision to reincorporate in Delaware, as opposed to remaining in the initial ‘home state’. 
Some found that firms are more likely to remain in their home state where this has 
adopted an anti-takeover statute, implying inefficient decisions.
36 Yet others have found 
weak evidence that firms avoid states with antitakeover statutes,
37 and choose to 
incorporate in jurisdictions with more flexible corporate laws and better-quality 
judiciary.
38 However, it is unnecessary for present purposes to form a firm view on the 
merits of US regulatory competition. This is because, as we shall see, the process will 
operate differently in the EU, such that the concerns of the US critics are unlikely to be 
replicated.
39 
 
3. The Basic Argument  
Following from these ideas, I shall now argue that as a general matter, regulatory 
competition in European company law can be both feasible and desirable.  
 
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES EU LAW PERMIT COMPANIES TO MIGRATE? 
Until recently, it was thought that the legal obstacles to regulatory arbitrage over 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., R. Daines, ‘Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?’ (2001) 62 J Fin Econ 525. Earlier 
studies are reviewed by Romano, supra n 23, 16-24. However, see also G. Subramanian, ‘The Disappearing 
Delaware Effect’ (2004) 20 J L Econ & Org 32 (arguing that any beneficial effect on firm value of 
Delaware reincorporation has diminished over time).  
36 G. Subramanian, ‘The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the 
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching’ (2002) 150 U Pa L Rev 1795; L.A. Bebchuk and A. 
Cohen, ‘Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate’ (2003) 46 J L & Econ 383. 
37 Daines, supra n 27, 1596-97; M. Kahan, ‘The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial 
Quality, or Takeover Protection’ (2004), NYU Law and Economics Working Paper No 04-015 
38 Kahan, ibid. 
39 See infra, text to n 123 ff. 
  12company law within the EU were profound.
40 First, the conflicts of law rules of the vast 
majority of Member States made use of the so-called ‘real seat’ theory in determining the 
existence and proper law of a company. In contrast to the ‘incorporation theory’ used in 
the US, this applies the law of the place where the company has its main place of 
business or ‘real seat’. When combined with rules on the recognition of the existence of 
corporate persons, it effectively prevented regulatory competition from taking place at 
all. For example, if a company incorporated in Member State A (which applied the 
incorporation theory) then carried on business in Member State B (which applied the real 
seat theory), the courts of Member State B would reason that the company’s proper law 
would be that of Member State B, and consequently, because it was not incorporated 
under that law, it was not validly formed at all.  
However, matters have changed dramatically following the ECJ decisions in 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art.
41 These cases relate to company law arbitrage at 
the point of formation. Each of the decisions concerned the treatment by Member State B 
of companies incorporated in Member State A, but having their ‘real seat’ in Member 
State B. The ECJ considered that the application of the real seat theory so as to deny 
recognition of the existence of the company in Member State B because it was not validly 
incorporated amounted to an interference with the company’s freedom of establishment. 
Essentially, the Court ruled that as a matter of EC law, a company, once validly formed 
under the laws of any Member State, becomes a ‘person’ and is consequently entitled to 
exercise the Treaty Freedoms.
42 Moreover, the mere fact that the company was 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Cheffins, supra n 8, 426-31. 
41 Supra, n 1. 
42 A voluminous literature has grown up on the legal consequences of the Centros line of cases. See, e.g., E. 
Wymeersch, ‘Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law’ in T. Baums et al (eds.), 
Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 629; 
E. Micheler, ‘The Impact of the Centros Case on Europe’s Company Law’ (2000) 21 Co Law 179; K. 
Baelz and T. Baldwin, ‘The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): the European Court of Justice 
Decision in Überseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company Law’ 
(2002) 3(12) German LJ; M. Siems, ‘Convergence, Competition, Centros and Conflicts of Law: European 
Company Law in the 21
st Century’ (2002) 27 EL Rev 47; T. Bachner, ‘Freedom of Establishment for 
Companies: A Great Leap Forward’ (2003) 62 CLJ 47; C. Kersting and C.P. Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire 
Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on Practice’ (2003) 4 German LJ 1277; W.-H. Roth, 
  13incorporated in Member State A solely to avoid laws which would otherwise apply, were 
it incorporated in Member State B, does not constitute an ‘abuse’ of that freedom. The 
consequence is that any laws of Member State B which tend to make the exercise of that 
freedom less attractive to companies incorporated in Member State A will therefore be 
struck down unless they satisfy the four-stage criteria set out in Gebhard:
43 that is, they 
are (i) applied in a non-discriminatory manner; (ii) are justified by imperative 
requirements of the public interest; (iii) secure the attainment of their objective; and (iv) 
are not disproportionate in their effect. 
As the dust gradually settles from the ECJ’s recent crusade in this area, it is 
coming to be appreciated that analyses of regulatory competition in European company 
law must consider the question in relation to two quite different contexts.
44 The first, 
heralded by the recent ECJ caselaw, is that of entrepreneurial ‘start-up’ companies, over 
which the competition will be for formations. The second context is that of established 
firms. Notwithstanding the developments in relation to ‘start-up’ companies, there remain 
a number of legal obstacles to reincorporation by established companies from Member 
State A to Member State B. First, and most obviously, the laws of many Member States 
(including the UK) do not permit such corporate ‘emigration’.
45 The ECJ’s ruling in 
Daily Mail,
46 as affirmed in Überseering and Inspire Art, seems to establish that this does 
not interfere with companies’ freedom of establishment, for the Court has held that 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘From Centros to Überseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private International Law, and Community 
Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 177; E. Wymeersch, ‘The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company 
Law’ (2003), ECGI Law Working Paper No 08/2003; J. Lowry, ‘Eliminating Obstacles to Freedom of 
Establishment: The Competitive Edge of UK Company Law’ (2004) 63 CLJ 331; S. Rammeloo, ‘At Long 
Last: Freedom of Establishment for Legal Persons in Europe Accomplished’ (2004) 11 MJ 379; D. 
Zimmer, note on Inspire Art, (2004) 41 CML Rev 1127; W.F. Ebke, ‘The European Conflict-of-Corporate-
Laws Revolution: Überseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’ (2005) EBL Rev 9. 
43 Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Colsiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-
4165. 
44 See Tröger, supra n 3; Gelter, supra n 3; Kieninger, supra n 3, 762-65. 
45 On the UK, see P. Smart, Cross-Border Insolvency, 2
nd ed. (London, Butterworths, 1998), 348-49. 
46 Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust plc [1988] ECR 5483. 
  14companies are ‘creatures’ of the national law under which they are formed and can 
exercise Treaty freedoms only consistently therewith. Secondly, many Member States 
impose ‘exit taxes’ on companies which seek to relocate either their registered or head 
office (again, as evidenced by the rule challenged in Daily Mail), which act as a financial 
disincentive to so doing.  
However, it is my view that these legal obstacles to change of primary 
establishment by existing companies are unlikely to persist. At the national level, some 
member states—such as the UK—are proposing to change their company laws so as to 
permit free jurisdictional (e)migration.
47 At the European level, a limited power to 
reincorporate in another jurisdiction has already been introduced by the Regulation 
implementing the European Public Company, or Societas Europaea (‘SE’).
48 SEs may be 
formed under the laws of any Member State by transformation from an existing public 
company, or through the merger of two or more such companies. Moreover, once 
established, an SE may subsequently change its jurisdiction of registered office.
49 More 
pertinently, the proposed Tenth Directive on Cross-Border Mergers,
50 and/or the draft 
Fourteenth Directive on Transfer of Registered Office,
51 are likely to introduce 
                                                 
47 See DTI, Company Law Reform, supra n 4, 48-9. 
48 EC Council Regulation 2157/2001 [2001] OJ L 294/1.  
49 Ibid., Art. 8. However, the extent to which this may be used as a mechanism of regulatory arbitrage is 
limited by the requirement that the head office—that is, the ‘seat’—must always be in the same jurisdiction 
as the registered office: Art. 7. See L. Enriques, ‘Silence is Golden: The European Company Statute as a 
Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage’ (2004) 4 JCLS 77, 79-84 (arguing that SE statute may itself facilitate 
regulatory competition); cf. McCahery and Vermeulen, supra n 13, 18-22. 
50 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Cross-Border Mergers of Companies with Share Capital’ COM (2003) 703 final, 18.11.2003, Art.3 and p. 
6. The Tenth Directive received approval from the European Council on 25.11.2004 (see European 
Commission, ‘Commission welcomes Council agreement on making cross-border mergers easier’ Press 
Release IP/04/1405, 25.11.2004). 
51 See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Fourteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on 
the Transfer of the Registered Office of a Company from one Member State to another with a Change of 
Applicable Law’ (1997), doc no XV/D2/6002/97-EN REV.2, Art. 2; European  Commission, ‘Company 
Law: Commission Consults on n the Cross-Border Transfer of Companies’ Registered Offices’, IP/04/270, 
26.02.2004. 
  15mechanisms by which a transfer of registered office may be achieved without 
necessitating a transfer of head office.  
Turning to exit taxes, it seems most likely that, once companies are granted 
freedom to relocate by European legislation (thereby bypassing Daily Mail), such fiscal 
rules will come to be viewed as unlawful restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
which companies would otherwise be able to exercise: a sort of corporate equivalent of 
the recent de Lastreyie du Saillant ruling which outlawed exit taxes levied by French law 
upon a natural person.
52 In a similar vein, the Merger Tax Directive outlaws tax 
impediments to cross-border mergers.
53 
Table 1 summarises the current and anticipated position. Not only is it legally 
possible for ‘start-up’ companies to engage in company law arbitrage on formation, but it 
seems likely that it will also soon be possible for established companies to do so through 
re-incorporation. 
 
Table 1: Current and anticipated legal framework for company law arbitrage 
Formation: ‘start-up’ companies  Reincorporation: established 
companies 
Barriers Removal  Barriers Removal 
Real seat theory  Centros etc: 
national laws must 
permit immigration 
 
Daily Mail: no need 
for national law to 
permit emigration 
10
th, 14
th Directives 
will shortly permit 
emigration 
Unnecessary and 
disproportionate 
measures failing 
Gebhard test 
Case-by-case 
challenge 
 
Exit taxes 
commonly levied 
Likely to fail 
Gebhard test; 
prohibited by Merger 
Tax Directive; will 
probably also be 
prohibited by 14
th 
Directive 
                                                 
52 Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lastreyie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie 
[2004] 3 CMLR 39. 
53 Council Directive 90/434/EEC [1990] OJ L 225/1. It is unclear whether the Merger Tax Directive applies 
to the formation of a SE by merger: see Enriques, supra n 3, 1261-62. However, an overwhelming majority 
of the respondents to the Commission’s consultation as respects Transfer of Seat were in favour of the 
express application of the Merger Tax Directive: see European Commission, ‘Public consultation on the 
outline of the planned proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the cross-border 
transfer of the registered office of a company’ (2004), question 14. 
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EVEN IF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE, WILL FIRMS 
WISH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE?  
For it to be legally possible for regulatory arbitrage to occur is, of course, only the 
starting point. If firms are actually to exercise this option, the benefits to them from doing 
so must exceed the costs. A number of scholars doubt whether this will be the case, at 
least on any significant scale. First, it is argued that there may be little legal benefit to be 
had from ‘jurisdiction-shopping’. The existing harmonization initiatives have reduced the 
differences between Member States’ company laws, at least compared with those that 
existed between States’ corporate laws in the US in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, when Delaware developed its dominant position.
54 Moreover, litigation 
by minority shareholders being much rarer in Europe than in the US,
55 the expected 
benefits from switching to a more ‘favourable’ company law regime may be small.  
A second factor concerns the nature of share ownership patterns. Unlike their 
Anglo-American counterparts, public companies in continental Europe typically have 
concentrated share ownership, with control being exercised by a single large blockholder 
or a coalition of blocks.
56 This alters the nature of the corporate law ‘product’ in which 
that such firms would be interested.
57 Rather than being concerned with protecting 
dispersed shareholders against the risk of managerial misbehaviour, shareholders in a 
blockholder system are more interested in the extent to which a majority is able to exert 
control.
58 If, as is likely, corporate laws and ownership patterns have co-evolved over 
time in European jurisdictions, there are likely to be strong complementarities between 
                                                 
54 See Cheffins, supra n 8, 433; Enriques, supra n 3, 1269; Kieninger, supra n 3, 769. 
55 Enriques, supra n 3, 1262. 
56 See R. La Porta et al., ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (1999) 44 J Fin 471, 491-98; F. Barca 
and M. Becht (eds.), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2001); M.J. Roe, Political 
Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 
57 Romano, supra n 23, 136-8. 
58 See Kraakman et al, supra n 4, 22, 53-4, 60-1. 
  17the two.
59 Thus, it is argued, there will be little to be gained by a firm re-incorporating 
under a different corporate law that will be likely to be mal-adapted to its particular 
governance requirements.
60  
Thirdly, some argue that problems over litigation will act as a brake on regulatory 
arbitrage.
61 A company whose centre of business is located in Member State B but which 
has reincorporated in Member State A would then have to decide where disputes should 
be litigated. To do so in Member State A would, it is thought, be undesirable in many 
cases, because of the need to retain different lawyers, to follow a different procedural 
system, and to consider issues in a different language.
62 On the other hand, litigation in 
Member State B would have the obvious drawback of having judges in Member State B 
decide questions on the laws of Member State A, with accompanying problems of 
linguistic and conceptual translation. To be sure, jurisdiction or arbitration agreements 
could be used to structure matters in most cases so that the problem is minimised, but on 
issues relating to the validity of the corporate constitution and the acts of its organs, the 
exclusive jurisdiction rule of Article 22(2) of the Judgments Regulation
63 would mandate 
that litigation take place in Member State A.
64 Thus the problems could not be avoided 
entirely. 
A fourth and closely related difficulty with regulatory arbitrage is thought to be 
the difficulties involved in getting appropriate legal advice both in relation to the 
                                                 
59 L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ 
(1999) 52 Stanf L Rev 127. 
60 Gelter, supra n 3, __. 
61 J.C. Dammann, ‘Freedom of Choice in European Company Law’ (2004) 29 Yale J Int’l L 477, 492-502; 
C. Kirchner et al, ‘Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art: Unbundling Delaware’s 
Product for Europe’ (2004), working paper, Humboldt University, Berlin and University of Illinois, 23-35. 
62 Kirchner et al, ibid. 
63 EC Council Regulation 44/2001 [2001] OJ L 12/1. Art 22(2) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of 
the Member State where the company has its ‘seat’. For jurisdictions using the incorporation theory, the 
‘seat’ will be interpreted as meaning the place of incorporation. This rule is mandatory, and may not be 
ousted by a jurisdiction clause: ibid., Art. 23(5). 
64 Dammann, supra n 61, 495. 
  18possibility of making the change and in structuring affairs subsequently.
65 The languages 
of possible states of reincorporation are likely to be different from that spoken by the 
company’s management. Moreover, any suggestion regarding change is likely to 
encounter hostility from incumbent legal advisers. What lawyer would propose 
reincorporation in a different jurisdiction, if this will result in legal work being 
transferred to another adviser? If the company’s existing legal team are unable to advise, 
it will be necessary to retain another law firm, which is likely to be based in the state of 
reincorporation, to advise instead. This may entail considerable risk, if the company does 
not have a good knowledge of the reputations of law firms in the new jurisdiction. 
I shall suggest that the arguments of the pessimists are unconvincing, and 
particularly so if it is posited that the UK might be the jurisdiction of choice for 
reincorporation. Once more, it is helpful to divide the discussion into the separate cases 
of arbitrage by formation and by re-incorporation. As far as formation is concerned, the 
driver of regulatory arbitrage by entrepreneurs is clearly the restrictive capital adequacy 
and maintenance requirements of many continental jurisdictions. As the Second 
Company Law Directive does not apply to private companies, there is considerable scope 
for variety between Member States’ laws, and the UK undoubtedly has a more permissive 
regime than most continental European jurisdictions. Thus, for an entrepreneur wishing 
to form a company without complying with expensive minimum capital requirements, the 
UK is clearly likely to be the jurisdiction of choice. 
To be sure, such a selection will entail increased legal risk owing to the need to 
litigate some issues in the UK, as opposed to local courts, and the need to obtain UK 
legal advice. There are reasons for thinking, however, that these costs are unlikely to act 
as a significant brake. First, there is likely to be little risk of litigation over the company’s 
internal affairs in the UK if it is owned only by a small group of shareholders, who might 
bind themselves with a shareholder agreement for good measure. External affairs could 
be directed towards the jurisdiction of choice through jurisdiction clauses as part of the 
company’s standard terms. As far as legal advice is concerned, it would appear that there 
                                                 
65 Dammann, supra n 61, 503-7; Enriques, supra n 3, 1264. These arguments are based on evidence from 
the US that the a company’s legal advisers are often key players in its decision (not) to reincorporate: see 
Romano, supra n 22, 274; Daines, supra n 37, 1580-1. 
  19is a market opportunity for lawyers serving the needs of such entrepreneurs to start to 
offer their services. An entrepreneur is unlikely to consult a lawyer frequently, and so the 
idea of ‘incumbent lawyer resistance’ is not particularly compelling. The indications are 
that specialist ‘formation agents’ are already targeting their services at continental 
European entrepreneurs in an attempt to win this business.
66 Further evidence comes 
from the recent dramatic increase in the number of companies located in continental 
Europe incorporating in the UK. To exemplify this, Figure 1 reports numbers of 
‘German’ companies incorporating in the UK.  
Figure 1: 'German' companies incorporating in UK
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These were identified by searching data from Companies House for companies with 
largely German-language names,
67 but ending with the word ‘Limited’.
68 To be sure, the 
                                                 
66 A typical example of many such agents found by a Google search is Coddan CPM UK, which offers, via 
the internet, same-day incorporation of a UK private company for a fee of £42. The website has versions, 
explaining arbitrage opportunities, in Spanish and German. See www.ukincorp.co.uk.  
67 Companies House DVD-ROM Directory (April 2005 edition). The relevant companies were identified by 
searching for names including the following terms: ‘AG’, ‘GmbH’, ‘Gesellschaft’, ‘und’, ‘mit’ and 
‘handel’. This methodology follows Kirchner et al, supra n 61, 6-7, but by searching on a wider range of 
German words, a larger number of companies were identified. The results were checked manually to ensure 
that the names were in German.  
  20data are only impressionistic;
69 moreover, they respresent only a tiny fraction of the total 
number of companies incorporated in the UK.
70 What is significant about the figures is 
the way in which the rate of such incorporations surged after the Überseering and Inspire 
Art decisions in 2002 and 2003 respectively.  
  Turning to larger companies, the discussion necessarily becomes more 
speculative. However, if a typical listed company is taken as the paradigm, there are still 
good reasons for thinking that the UK may be an attractive reincorporation choice to 
many, notwithstanding the foregoing objections. First, despite the early harmonization 
efforts, many feel that the UK’s company law still has a substantially more flexible 
character than the company laws of many other European jurisdictions.
71 To be sure, the 
difference is nowhere near as significant as the regulation gradient between Delaware and 
its competitors in the early twentieth century. Yet it is not simply the content of corporate 
law that makes reincorporation attractive. Commentators in the US have argued that a 
significant part of Delaware’s advantage comes from the way in which adjudication is 
conducted. This includes the quality, expertise and ‘business-friendliness’ of its 
judiciary.
72 Thus it is notable that Delaware is the only state in the US to have a specialist 
court for the trial of corporate matters,
73 and Kahan’s recent empirical study of 
incorporation decisions suggests that judicial quality is at least as important to firms 
choosing where to incorporate as the relative flexibility of key provisions in the corporate 
code.
74 Other related factors are the existence of a rich body of precedents accumulated 
                                                                                                                                                 
68 The suffix ‘Limited’ excludes firms incorporated in Germany but registered in the UK as an ‘overseas 
company’.  
69 The data may be both under- and over-inclusive. On the one hand, the search methodology does not 
capture all German-language names. On the other hand, the data do not tell us whether these companies in 
fact carry on any business in the UK. 
70 There were over 2 million companies registered in the UK in 2003-4: DTI, Companies in 2003-4 
(London: TSO, 2004), 33. 
71 See, e.g., CLSRG, The Strategic Framework, supra n 4, 96-8; Dammann, supra n 61, 525. 
72 See Romano, supra n 23, 39-40; Kahan, supra n 37. 
73 Kahan and Kamar, supra n 72, 708-15. 
74 Kahan, supra n 37. 
  21over many years of judicial law-making, which enhance the certainty of legal rules, and 
the availability of high-quality legal advice through Delaware’s specialist corporate law 
bar.
75 
Throughout Europe, the UK is perhaps uniquely positioned to capitalise on these 
procedural aspects of corporate law choice.
76 Similarly to Delaware, the UK has a 
specialist court list devoted solely to corporate matters.
77 This is presided over by judges 
who have spent many years in practice specialising in corporate matters, in contrast to the 
practice in many other Member States of appointing judges direct from law school.
78 In 
terms of certainty, it appears that English judges place even greater weight on precedents 
than their American counterparts.
79 This combination of legal flexibility and certainty 
permits UK companies to structure their affairs as they wish and with a low risk of legal 
challenge.  
However, for European companies considering reincorporating, these factors may 
be less salient than for their US counterparts, owing to the relatively low litigation rates 
in Europe.
80 Yet to focus on ‘hard law’ alone would be to miss entirely the juiciest part of 
the ‘carrot’ that will attract such firms. This is because much of what is important about 
the English approach to regulating the control of listed companies is not found in the 
companies legislation at all, but in the body of ‘soft law’ rules and codes that apply to 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The most important of these are the UK 
                                                 
75 Romano, supra n 23, 41; cf. E. Kamar, ‘A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate 
Law’ (1998) 98 Colum L Rev 1908. 
76 Cheffins, supra n 8, 442-3. 
77 See Rt Hon Lord Justice Brooke (ed.), Civil Procedure, Vol. 2 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2004), 
paras 1-143, 2G-14.  
78 M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
150; M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
220. However, it should be noted that many civilian jurisdictions provide for judicial specialisation in 
corporate/commercial matters. 
79 See P.S. Atiyah and R.S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987), 118-27; R. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 84-
92.  
80 See supra, n 55, and text thereto. 
  22Listing Rules and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. These deal with a range of 
matters that might equally well be regulated by company law,
81 including rules regarding 
substantive corporate governance,
82 and most obviously, takeovers.
83  
As compared with ‘true’ company law, these self-regulatory rules offer two key 
advantages in terms of functionality. First, they are capable of being continuously 
updated in response to developments in the market, and secondly, they are promulgated 
and enforced by persons with relevant business and market expertise. Both the Listing 
Rules and the City Code originated as self-regulatory rules.
84 They owe their content and 
mode of enforcement largely to the preferences of UK institutional investors, who hold in 
excess of 60 per cent of the shares listed on the London Stock Exchange.
85 These 
institutions have sufficiently large interests to make it worthwhile to become involved 
both in setting up self-regulatory structures and lobbying government to avoid further 
encroachment of legislation.
86 The regulatory structures which have emerged are those 
                                                 
81 See UK Listing Rules, rr. 10.5, 10.37 (significant transactions requiring shareholder approval); ch. 11 
(related party transactions requiring shareholder approval); rr. 4.16-21 (pre-emption rights); Ch. 15 (share 
repurchases); and Ch. 12 and Model Code (directors’ share dealings). 
82 UKLA, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance    (July 2003), available at 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf. 
83 The Takeover Panel, City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions of Shares, 7
th ed. (Bowne International: London, 2002) plus updates. A regularly updated 
version of the City Code can be viewed at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.  
84 The Listing Rules are now, of course, promulgated and enforced by the Financial Services Authority. 
The implementation of the Takeover Directive will see a statutory basis put in place for the Takeover 
Panel’s jurisdiction, but will not, it seems, result in significant changes to the Panel’s composition or mode 
of operating: see DTI, Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids URN 05/511 (TSO: 
London, 2005), 11-24. 
85 M. Becht and C. Mayer, ‘Introduction’ in Barca and Becht (eds.), supra n 56, 1, 26 (62%). 
86 See B.S. Black and J.C. Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited 
Regulation’ (1994) 92 Mich L Rev 1997, 2034-41; G.P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 55-153; Cheffins, supra n 8, 364-421; P. Davies, 
‘Shareholder Value, Company Law, and Securities Markets Law: A British View’ in K. Hopt and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 261, 279-87; J. Armour and 
D.A. Skeel, ‘Who Makes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?’ working paper, University of 
Cambridge/University of Pennsylvania Law School (2005). 
  23which these institutions consider serve their interests, as is most obviously the case with 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the City Code on Takeovers. These 
codes are regularly updated by reviews which respond rapidly to changes in the way in 
which the market operates,
87 and invariably take into account the wishes of institutional 
investors. 
It seems that the self-regulatory aspect of the UK system is in practice far more 
significant for companies than the content and enforcement of company law itself. To 
illustrate: during the year 2002-3, the Takeover Panel were involved in advising on 305 
transactions raising issues in relation to the Takeover Code, of which 108 resulted in 
published takeover or merger proposals.
88 Yet in the same period, there were only four 
cases decided in UK courts raising issues of company law involving listed companies.
89 
This is not, however, to say that company law is irrelevant. Rather, it is a feature of the 
UK’s system of company law that it permits such activities as takeovers to be regulated 
by the Code and enforced by the Panel as opposed to by the company law and the 
judiciary respectively.  
The implications of this picture for our discussion are as follows. For a company 
with dispersed equity ownership, or which wishes to move towards it, the UK system 
provides an extremely attractive set of solutions to the managerial agency problem: 
hostile takeovers, shareholder control of related party and significant transactions, and 
pre-emption rights protection. This is combined with a system of company law that is 
                                                 
87 Thus, the ‘Combined Code’ of corporate governance has been revised three times since its first 
incarnation as the ‘Cadbury Code’ in 1992 (following the Greenbury Report in 1995, the Hampel Report in 
1998 and the Higgs Report in 2003). Similarly, the Code Committee of the Takeover Panel meets four 
times annually to review the workings of the City Code and propose revisions (see Takeover Panel, Report 
on the Year Ended 31
st March 2004, 10-12). 
88 The Takeover Panel, Report on the Year Ended 31st March 2003, 14 (period from 1 April 2002 to 31 
March 2003). 
89 Criterion Properties plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC [2002] EWCA Civ 1883, [2003] 2 BCLC 129 
(validity of corporate transaction); Chaston v. SWP Group plc [2002] EWCA Civ 1999, [2003] 1 BCLC 
675 (financial assistance); PNC Telecom plc v. Thomas [2002] EWHC 2848 (Ch), [2004] 1 BCLC 88 
(whether notice of EGM served by fax valid); Re Marconi plc [2003] All ER (D) 362 (scheme of 
arrangement). These were identified using LEXIS. A further 12 cases involved issues of insolvency law 
relating to companies that had formerly been listed.  
  24relatively flexible, and is enforced by a highly specialist judiciary. At present it is 
possible for a company to opt into the Listing Rules by applying to join the UK Official 
List regardless of where its registered office or seat is located.
90 In contrast, it is not 
currently possible for a company that is not ‘resident’ in the UK—a test equivalent to the 
‘real seat’—to be subject to the Takeover Panel’s jurisdiction. With the implementation 
of the Takeover Directive, however, this will change. The Takeover Panel will shortly 
take jurisdiction over offers in respect of any company with its real seat within the EU 
that is listed in the UK and which has a registered office in the UK.
91   
Such a system is, to be sure, most unlikely to be attractive to a continental 
company subject to stable control by a large blockholder.
92 Such a blockholder is likely 
to enjoy significant ‘private benefits of control’.
93 Compliance with the UK Listing Rules 
would lessen their ability to enjoy these, through the one-share one-vote rules that outlaw 
complex and opaque ownership structures, and the restrictions on related party 
transactions. Moreover, the body of rules directed towards minimising managerial agency 
costs would be irrelevant for such a company, where the large blockholder will already 
be well-placed to keep management under careful scrutiny.  
However, if such a blockholder wished to ‘unwind’ their holding, reincorporation 
in the UK would, by contrast, seem a much more attractive option to consider. This is 
because there is likely to be limited liquidity in any market for large blocks of shares.
94 
Much greater liquidity could be obtained by breaking up the block and selling the shares 
to many small dispersed shareholders. To do so in a blockholder system would not, 
                                                 
90 Listing Rules, r. 3.2. 
91 See Takeover Panel, Explanatory Paper: Implementation of the European Directive on Takeover Bids 
(20 January 2005), 5-6. 
92 See L.A. Bebchuk, ‘A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control’ NBER Working 
Paper No 7203, July 1999. 
93 For evidence relating to continental Europe, see K. Gugler, ‘Beneficial Block-Holders versus 
Entrenchment and Rent Extraction?’ in K. Gugler (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic 
Performance (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 26. 
94 See M. Becht, ‘European Corporate Governance: Trading off Liquidity Against Control’ (1999) 43 
European Economic Review 1071.  
  25however, raise the maximum possible revenue. This is because, in a system which 
permits private benefits of control to be extracted, a dispersed ownership structure is 
unstable—that is, there are gains to be made by acquiring a controlling block and 
extracting the private benefits.
95 Shares generally would then trade at a discount in 
anticipation of the unfavourable possibility of being in the minority when control had 
been taken by a blockholder.
96  
Thus the argument is that controlling shareholders in continental European 
companies that wish to liquidate (or diversify) their holdings could do so most effectively 
through listing and reincorporating in the UK.
97 The extent to which such blockholdings 
will unwind is, of course, contentious. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for thinking 
that significant numbers of blockholders in continental Europe will wish to make this 
transition. The value of the rents which a blockholder may extract are declining owing to 
European integration’s enhancement of product market competition;
98 at the same time, 
reductions in capital gains taxes have eliminated a former penalty to divestment of 
blockholdings.
99 Consistently with these suggestions, the early evidence suggests that 
even within the strongly blockholder system of Germany, there has been a reduction in 
ownership concentration over the past 10 years.
100 
The preceding discussion does of course beg the question of whether blockholders 
wishing to avail themselves of opportunities for regulatory arbitrage will be able to obtain 
                                                 
95 Bebchuk, supra n 92. 
96 See Bebchuk and Roe, supra n 59, 142-53.  
97 Another plausible scenario is that a private equity firm would purchase the blockholder’s stake, and then 
having restructured the firm, seek to take the company public again in a way that would increase the value 
of the share price. See H. Timmons, ‘Private Equity Investors are Reshaping the Landscape of European 
Business’, New York Times, 5 May 2005, C12. 
98 See M.J. Roe, ‘The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization’ (2001) 149 U 
Pa L Rev 2063. 
99 Frick and Lehmann, supra n 9, 123. 
100 See D. Wojcik, ‘Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings 
1997-2001’ (2003) 35 Environment and Planning A 1431; S. Thomsen, ‘Convergence of Corporate 
Governance during the Stock Market Bubble: Towards Anglo-American or European Standards?’ in A. 
Grandori (ed.), Corporate Governance and Firm Organization (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 297, 306-12. 
  26appropriate legal advice. Indeed, the idea of ‘lawyer resistance’ is one of the most 
heavily-pressed reasons for thinking that regulatory competition will not occur. However, 
it overlooks the transformation that has recently been effected in the European market for 
legal services. Large London-based law firms have aggressively expanded by merging 
with, or taking over, their continental counterparts.
101 Whilst the so-called ‘magic circle’ 
of London law firms have maintained offices in locations around the world for many 
years, these had until recently been little more than symbolic outposts. However, since 
the late 1990s, several of them have changed strategy in favour of practising ‘local law’. 
As a result, they are now truly multi-jurisdictional in their orientation.
102 Table 2 shows 
the dramatic increase in the number of ‘overseas’ fee-earners in these firms over the 
period 1999-2005. This expansion in geographic scope has been mirrored by a similarly 
dramatic encroachment of their brand names upon continental European markets for legal 
services. For example, nearly all of the ‘top 10’ German firms in 2004 were organisations 
that had either merged with, or formed a ‘strategic alliance’ with, a London firm.
103  
 
Table 2: The international transformation of large ‘London’ law firms  
 
% fee-earners outside UK  Name 
1999 2003  2005 
Clifford Chance  41  63  62 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer  50  61  66 
Linklaters n/a  52  55 
Allen & Overy  35  48  53 
Lovells 23  55  57 
Source: International Financial Services London, City Business Series: Legal Services, 
1999-2005.  
 
This transformation has been driven by globalisation and consolidation in the 
                                                 
101 Linklaters, for example, merged in Germany, Belgium and Sweden (The Lawyer, The Lawyer UK 100, 
2004).  
102 International Financial Services London, City Business Series: Legal Services (London: IFSL, 1999, 
2003, 2005). 
103 See JUVE Handbook of German Commercial Law Firms 2004, ‘Ranking National Review’, 
www.juve.de.   
  27financial services sector, with law firms growing in size as they seek to capture 
economies of scale associated with increased deal size.
104 The process of globalisation 
has brought with it increasingly direct competition with American law firms, which are 
able to draw upon work from deals generated by an economy approximately seven times 
the size of that of the UK. It seems a natural response for UK firms to seek to integrate 
the European market for legal services.
105 Thus these former ‘London’ firms are now 
pan-European, multi-jurisdictional and multi-language in their operations, and ideally 
placed to mediate between European jurisdictions.
106 Against this background, 
jurisdictional arbitrage is an obvious service offering.
107 If a particular system of 
corporate law does offer cost advantages for large corporate clients (be they procedural or 
substantive), then these firms may be expected to offer this aggressively to their clients. 
The ‘lawyer hostility’ problem is greatly reduced where the incumbent and the new 
adviser are both within the same firm.
108 
To recapitulate: regulatory arbitrage is already occurring at the level of ‘start-up’ 
                                                 
104 R.S. Thomas, et al, ‘Megafirms’ (2001) 80 NC L Rev 115; A. Hodgart, ‘Globalization and the Future of 
International Law Firms—The Perspective of a Management Consultant’ in J. Drolshammer and M. Pfeifer 
(eds.), The Internationalisation of the Practice of Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 173, 
194-202. On the historical background in London, see R.G. Lee, ‘From Profession to Business: The Rise 
and Rise of the City Law Firm’ in P.A. Thomas (ed.), Tomorrow’s Lawyers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 31. 
105 However, the US firms are also competing aggressively throughout Europe: see, e.g., C. Griffiths, ‘The 
UK firms are thinking global, but the savvier US practices are starting to act local’, The Lawyer Global 
100, 2004.  
106 See E. Wymeersch, ‘Company Law in Turmoil and the Way to “Global Company Practice”’ (2003) 3 
JCLS 283, 286-7. 
107 Hence the marketing of English law to clients can credibly be seen as a means of saving the client 
money as opposed to maximising fee income (‘rents’) for the lawyers. 
108 To be sure, there may be an inter-branch agency problem within such a firm. That is, lawyers in the 
branch in Member State B will naturally be loath to recommend to their local clients that they reincorporate 
in Member State A and thereby transfer their account to a different branch. This effect will be pitted against 
the firm’s need to survive as a whole, which will depend upon successfully implementing its strategy. 
Lawyers in Member State B may therefore find their remuneration being structured so as to overcome such 
opposition, or being encouraged to re-tool in the law of Member State A. Future generations of lawyers in 
Member State B may indeed seek to qualify or learn the law of Member State A instead: Delaware’s is the 
substantive corporate law taught at top law schools throughout the US. 
  28incorporations. Moreover, there are good reasons for thinking that once reincorporation 
becomes legally possible for large companies, continental firms that wish to shift from 
blockholder to dispersed ownership may wish to engage in regulatory arbitrage in favour 
of the UK, the system which offers the best-adapted legal and regulatory environment for 
this ownership pattern. In so doing, they will be able to obtain advice from international 
law firms.  
 
 
WILL MEMBER STATES HAVE INCENTIVES TO COMPETE TO ATTRACT 
(RE)INCORPORATIONS? 
Regulatory arbitrage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regulatory 
competition. True regulatory competition requires that lawmakers respond to the threat or 
opportunity posed by firms’ arbitrage activities so as to retain or attract incorporations. 
Once again, a number of scholars have voiced the opinion that such regulatory 
competition will not emerge to any significant extent within Europe. In other words, the 
necessary preconditions for the supply of corporate law in response to companies’ 
preferences will not exist.
109 Unlike the position in the US, EU Member States are unable 
to derive significant amounts of revenue from ‘charter taxes’ levied on companies 
because these are prohibited by EU law, save in the Member State where the company 
has its real seat.
110 Moreover, it is thought that there is little prospect that the relevant 
Directive will be repealed, because business interest groups are likely to lobby against 
such change.
111 
There seems little doubt that the particular conditions which originally gave rise 
to Delaware’s ascendancy at the turn of the twentieth century will not be replicated in 
                                                 
109 Romano, supra n 23, 133-4; Enriques, supra n 3, 1266-73; Dammann, supra n 54, 520-21; Gelter, supra 
n 3, __; Tröger, supra n 3, __, __. 
110 Council Directive 69/335/EEC [1969] OJ L 249/25 (prohibiting the levying of taxes or above-cost 
charges for the formation or registration of a company except in the case of prescribed ‘capital duties’ 
levied in the country where the company has its centre of management: arts 2(1), 10). 
111 G. Hertig, ‘Efficient Fostering of EU Regulatory Competition’, (2004) SZW/RSDA 5 Kurzbeiträge, 
369, 370. 
  29Europe. Yet simply because no European state will have the same incentives as Delaware 
does not mean that regulatory competition cannot emerge. Once again, it is helpful to 
segment the analysis into law reforms that will make a jurisdiction attractive to 
incorporations, and those which will be relevant for larger, established companies. It 
appears that continental legislatures have already become concerned at the prospect of 
large-scale evasion of their legal capital requirements through incorporations in the UK. 
Some, such as France and Spain, have already relaxed their capital maintenance 
regimes;
112 others, such as Germany, are considering ways to respond.
113 The UK 
government, which has already acknowledged its desire to ensure English company law 
is internationally ‘competitive’,
114 has recently announced further deregulation of legal 
capital requirements in relation to private companies, including outright abolition on the 
prohibition on the giving of financial assistance by such a company for the acquisition of 
its own shares.
115 These sorts of changes are by definition, regulatory competition. 
To be sure, once—as seems highly likely to happen—legal capital rules are 
relaxed for private companies by other Member States, it seems unlikely that the UK’s 
emergent ‘competitive advantage’ in this field will remain. With this obstacle removed at 
home, entrepreneurs will no longer have a compelling reason to incur the transaction 
costs of incorporating abroad. This will be more a case of ‘defensive’ regulatory 
competition that the ‘active’ version exhibited by Delaware, but it will be regulatory 
competition nevertheless.  
Let us now consider the same issue in relation to the law relating to listed 
companies. I have suggested that the UK is likely to be the jurisdiction of choice for 
firms wishing to reincorporate so as to optimise their company law regime to a dispersed 
ownership structure. There are two reasons for thinking that the UK will have powerful 
incentives to adjust its company law environment so as to attract them, notwithstanding 
                                                 
112 See J. Simon, ‘A Comparative Approach to Capital Maintenance: France’ (2004) 15 EBL Rev 1037;  
Kieninger, supra n 44, 768. 
113 Rammeloo, supra n 42, 409. 
114 See CLSRG, Final Report, Vol I, supra n 4, xi, 6; DTI, Company Law Reform, supra n 4, 9. 
115 DTI, ibid., 41-3. 
  30the lack of franchise taxes.  
The first factor is the importance of legal services revenues to the UK economy. 
Having so much at stake, the UK-oriented pan-European law firms constitute a powerful 
interest group in lobbying for or against legal change that is likely to affect the 
competitiveness of English law.
116 The power of legal professionals’ ability to drive 
regulatory competition has recently been demonstrated by Sitkoff and Schanzenbach’s 
study of the dramatic evolution of tax-haven trust structures in the US, a practice which, 
given the function of these vehicles, is clearly not motivated by tax revenues derived by 
the states which are ‘competing’.
117 
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the UK’s legal profession is also much 
better placed to spur regulatory competition than is Delaware’s. Kahan and Kamar have 
argued that Delaware lawyers, as an interest group, are not a significant motor for 
regulatory competition.
118 On their analysis, the marginal revenues to lawyers practising 
in Delaware from legal business related to out-of-state incorporations attracted to 
Delaware are insignificant.
119 Yet the revenues of lawyers practising in Delaware are 
likely to be a small fraction of the total economic value derived from Delaware law by 
US legal practitioners. Most of the legal advice to listed firms incorporated in Delaware 
is not provided by lawyers practising in Delaware, but in large cities such as New 
York.
120 In contrast, a much larger proportion of the legal services revenues generated by 
UK company law would be captured by the UK. This is because London, the financial 
centre where many of the legal service providers are based, is geographically within the 
UK. As voters, taxpayers and experts, London lawyers may therefore be expected to be 
                                                 
116 Cheffins, supra n 8, 437-8. 
117 R. Sitkoff and M.M. Schanzenbach, ‘Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis 
of Perpetuities and Taxes’, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No 05-07 (2005). 
118 Kahan and Kamar, supra n 72, 694-8. 
119 Ibid., 698-9. 
120 Whilst leading New York M&A firms such as Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, 
Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, Sullivan & Cromwell and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz do not have 
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  31an influential interest group in the development of UK company law.
121 
The second reason for thinking that the UK company law environment will be 
highly responsive is closely related. It centres on the ‘soft’ or ‘private’ nature of crucial 
regulation such as the Takeover Code. Private legislatures are able to capture a much 
greater proportion of the economic benefits of marginal revenues generated by ‘users’ of 
their laws than do public legislatures.
122 A public legislature is required to use tax 
revenues to provide public services, and so faces a steeply declining marginal utility 
curve from extra tax income. A private legislature, on the other hand, is effectively 
providing a service as a business and so derives a much greater marginal utility than its 
public counterpart from additional revenues generated by ‘users’. It can therefore be 
expected to be much more responsive to the preferences of those who make use of it. 
This, coupled with the potential size of the professional services revenues, makes it likely 
that the UK has incentive enough to compete for reincorporations of listed companies. 
 
WILL SAFEGUARDS BE IN PLACE TO ENSURE A ‘RACE TO THE TOP’ RATHER 
THAN ‘TO THE BOTTOM’? 
My prediction is that, following the likely liberalisation of rules regarding transfer of 
registered office, there is real potential for a market in European company law to develop, 
and a significant possibility that the UK will be the favoured state of immigration for 
many continental listed companies. This in turn raises the question of whether this will be 
desirable. In other words, will the ‘race’ be to the bottom or to the top? 
Once again, my suggestions will be sanguine. It is apposite to begin with the 
theoretical critique of regulatory competition in US state corporate law. Bebchuk and 
others argue that because shareholders have insufficient control over the reincorporation 
decision, choices are likely to be made in favour of jurisdictions that entrench managers, 
                                                 
121 The Company Law Committees of the Law Society and the City of London Law Society are well-
organised and powerful lobby groups that are in a position to offer effective arguments in favour (against) a 
change that will enhance (decrease) the attractiveness of English law to their clients. See, e.g., responses to 
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  32as opposed to maximising the value of firms. Under most corporate codes in the US, a 
decision to reincorporate may be made by a simple majority of the general meeting, 
following a proposal put by the board. Bebchuk’s claim is that, in an environment of 
dispersed share ownership, a simple majority is too low a threshold to overcome the 
owner-manager agency problem.
123 Thus managements’ proposals for reincorporation 
will tend to be biased towards jurisdictions with pro-manager provisions—especially 
laws that facilitate defences to hostile takeovers (as does Delaware). 
Put more generally, the potential problem is this: laws that embody restrictions 
which will maximise value in the face of agency costs are unlikely to be adopted where 
the choice of law is itself pervaded by the same agency problem. Indeed, it is possible 
that such agency problems could be present not just along the manager-shareholder axis, 
but also along shareholder-shareholder, shareholder-creditor and the shareholder-
employee axes. The solution in each case is to ensure that procedural safeguards are in 
place so that the group who stand to be potentially disadvantaged by a change in 
corporate law will have been able to exercise genuine voice in the process. Thus Bebchuk 
argues that the perceived problem in the dynamics of US reincorporation could be solved 
by a federal rule that increases shareholder involvement in decisions about 
reincorporation, thus making it considerably more likely that the choice will benefit 
shareholders by enhancing the firm’s overall value, as opposed simply to transferring 
wealth from shareholders to managers.
124  In the EU context, this sort of federal rule, 
which seeks to influence the process by which state law develops, as opposed to the 
substance of the rules themselves, has been termed by Deakin ‘procedural 
harmonisation’.
125 Put most generally, this refers to rules intended to direct regulatory 
competition towards ‘the top’ rather than ‘the bottom’.
126  
                                                 
123 Bebchuk, supra n 34, 1459-61, 1470-75. 
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e.g, Romano, supra n 32. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to take a view on the merits of the US 
  33It seems highly likely that in the EU context, the opening of the road to regulatory 
competition in corporate law will be accompanied by the implementation of procedural 
safeguards to protect affected constituencies from proposed changes driven by 
opportunistic motives. Once again, it is helpful to distinguish the contexts of ‘formation 
choice’—already permitted under EU law—and ‘midstream reincorporation’, which it 
has been argued will soon be generally facilitated by the proposed Cross-Border Mergers 
and Transfer of Registered Office Directives. Put at its most general, the difference is 
this: on formation, all parties are able to bargain for appropriate protection. Midstream 
changes, however, can be passed without unanimous consent of the affected parties, and 
so offer the possibility of opportunistic dilution of agreed protections.
127 For policy 
purposes, the analysis of a company’s choice of governing law is no different from the 
way in which any other aspect of a company’s constitution might be selected. 
Consider, first, competition over ‘formation choice’. Here, every shareholder, 
creditor and employee has the opportunity to bargain with the new enterprise, and either 
to secure for herself terms that are satisfactory, or to decline to become involved. 
Provided adequate notice is given, then in principle any selected law should be value-
maximising. To be sure, there may be problems of information asymmetry, or inequality 
of bargaining power. To the extent that such problems exist, they can be ameliorated 
either by substantively harmonized provisions, as has been the case with employment law 
rules and securities regulation, or by Member State national laws that are capable of 
satisfying the Gebhard criteria: that is, they are both ‘effective and proportionate’ at 
achieving the goal of ameliorating the market failure in question. 
Now consider ‘midstream changes’. The concern here is encapsulated by the 
following hypothetical: protections for a particular constituency (say, codetermination 
rights for the employees) are embodied in the company law of Member State B. Such 
                                                                                                                                                 
debate. The discussion in the text is simply concerned to show that European regulatory competition will 
not result in a ‘race to the bottom’: this is done most effectively by demonstrating that the concerns of the 
US pessimists will not be replicated in Europe.  
127 See L. Bebchuk, ‘Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments’ (1989) 102 Harv L Rev 1820 (arguing for restrictions on post-formation alterations 
of corporate constitution, owing to greater shareholder information costs).  
  34provisions may be economically justified—for example, in relation to firms where 
employees are asked to make significant investments in firm-specific human capital. 
Entitlements to influence the firm’s governance may reassure the employees that the firm 
will not renege on any implicit promises to share supracompetitive profits with the 
employees ex post in return for the latter’s ex ante investments.
128 Regardless of whether 
this reasoning justifies mandatory (as opposed to default) protection for employees,
129 
any such protection will be rendered entirely worthless if the firm has the option to 
renege on its commitments ex post simply by reincorporating in a jurisdiction where 
codetermination is not recognised. 
This problem, in relation to employees, has long been a roadblock to negotiation 
of the Tenth and Fourteenth Directives. However, the solution agreed in respect of the 
Societas Europaea will probably form a blueprint for the final versions of the other two 
proposals.
130 For employees, the principal protection is given through the provision for 
structured bargaining on formation of an SE.
131 This requires the management of pre-SE 
entities to engage in precursory negotiations with a body of employee representatives, 
with a view to agreeing employee participation rights in relation to the new entity.
132 If 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., M.M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, ‘The Conceptual 
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  35no agreement is reached after six months,
133 then as a default, a set of employee 
information/consultation and/or participation rights is put in place, the content of which is 
determined by the most employee-favourable of the regime(s) applying to the pre-SE 
entity or entities from which the European public company is formed.
134 The effect is to 
encourage an agreement that is no less favourable to the employees than their 
entitlements under the pre-SE entities.
135 Of course, if the employees can be persuaded to 
agree, then it is possible to abandon, or at least modify, the existing participation 
rights.
136 Thus the negotiation structure permits the parties to abandon participation rights 
if it is efficient to do so—that is, the benefits of such change exceed the costs to the 
employees, who will need to be compensated in order to induce them to agree.
137  The SE 
legislation, albeit complex, therefore provides a sound blueprint for the protection of 
employee interests.
138  
Moreover, it is quite plausible that, with such procedural protection in place, a 
certain amount of specialisation might occur in national corporate law structures. Thus, it 
has been argued that German codetermination structures provide a means of offering 
employees a ‘credible commitment’ that their investments in firm-specific human capital 
will be protected. Firms for which such commitments are valuable will have no incentive 
to renege upon them by reincorporating in jurisdictions such as the UK, which do not 
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  36have codetermination rules. But the process rule model of the SE legislation would 
permit firms for which such codetermination is inappropriate to opt out by 
reincorporating, provided that the value realised in so doing is greater than the cost 
imposed on the employees.
139 By so protecting the interests of employees in any firm that 
seeks to switch 'out' of codetermination, the SE’s structured bargaining mechanisms will 
ensure that this cannot be used as a tactic to undermine the credibility of such 
commitments.
140  
Similar safeguards can be put in place to protect shareholders from opportunistic 
transfer of governing laws by management. Again, the SE legislation provides an 
instructive model. Under the SE regulation, at least a supermajority (two-thirds) 
shareholder vote is required in order to transfer the registered office
141 or to form an SE 
by merger.
142A similar rule would apply under the proposed Fourteenth Directive.
143  
Under the proposed Cross-Border Mergers Directive, the ‘general meeting’ must approve 
the terms of any proposed merger, but the contours of the process which followed will be 
left to the national laws of the member states governing the companies concerned.
144  
As regards creditors, the SE Regulations, and the proposals for the Tenth and 
Fourteenth Directives, will leave the question of any safeguards prior to transfer of 
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save as otherwise provided in the Directive).  
  37registered office to the national laws of the company concerned.
145 However, the 
treatment of creditors is complicated by the fact that many countries choose to protect 
them through corporate insolvency law, and so the discussion of the desirability of 
regulatory competition in relation to this constituency is postponed until the next section, 
where the question is tackled directly in relation to insolvency law. 
To summarise, this section has suggested that (i) regulatory competition is already 
occurring in relation to ‘start-up’ companies; (ii) the existing legal obstacles to regulatory 
competition in relation to company law for public companies are likely to be removed in 
the next few years; (iii) the UK is likely to be the jurisdiction of choice for many such 
companies, although there will also be new possibilities for jurisdictional specialisation in 
particular ‘models’ of company law; and (iv) procedural harmonization at the EU level 
(summarised in Table 3) will ensure that the ‘race’ is not to the bottom. 
 
Table 3: Procedural protection for constituencies in company law arbitrage 
 
  Formation Reincorporation 
Shareholders 
 
-Supermajority vote 
requirement 
 
Employees 
 
 
-Initial bargain with firm 
-‘Effective and proportionate’ 
restrictions under national law 
(if any) 
 
 
 
-‘Acquired rights’ carried over 
or waiver agreed by 
employees 
 
 
 
4. Extending the argument: Insolvency law and creditor protection  
In the final part, the analysis turns to the extent to which regulatory competition may and 
should be permitted to operate in relation to Member State laws designed to protect 
creditors. The issue is considered separately because in many jurisdictions, the protection 
of corporate creditors is understood to be a matter of corporate insolvency law. This body 
of law is often treated separately from company law, typically being understood either as 
                                                 
145 Regulation 2157/2001, Art. 8(7); Proposal for Tenth Directive, supra n 51, Art. 2; Proposal for 
Fourteenth Directive, supra n 51, Art. 8. 
  38a procedural matter or as part of commercial law. This impression of partition is 
reinforced by the fact that jurisdiction and choice of law in European insolvency 
proceedings is governed by sui generis legislation, the European Insolvency Regulation 
(‘EIR’).
146 Significantly for present purposes, the EIR is widely thought to be based upon 
connecting factors that bear more in common with the ‘real seat’ theory than the 
incorporation theory.  
Two salient questions arise. First, can it be argued that corporate insolvency law 
constitutes an entirely separate regime from company law, such that the principles 
established in the recent ECJ corporate freedom of establishment cases do not apply to it? 
If so, then this might have the effect of stopping the nascent regulatory competition for 
‘start-up’ formations dead in its tracks: in place of company law creditor protection rules 
that impede freedom of establishment, Member States could simply substitute identical 
rules located in their corporate insolvency law.  
I will argue that no such presumptive partition can be supported. This is in 
keeping with the functional approach to the scope of company law which formed the first 
‘building block’ for our analysis.
147 Corporate insolvency law supplies rules which 
govern companies experiencing financial distress, and so it is appropriate to consider it as 
being within the scope of a functional account of ‘company law’.
148 In particular, there 
may be complementarities between insolvency law and other aspects of a country’s 
corporate governance regime,
149 which implies that if it is desirable to permit companies 
to select a company law regime so as to achieve a better ‘fit’ with their corporate 
governance requirements, it is likely also to be desirable for them to be able to select the 
                                                 
146 EC Council Regulation 1346/2000 [2000] OJ L160/1. Jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings was 
specifically excluded from the Brussels Convention (now consolidated as EC Council Regulation 44/2001 
[2001] OJ L12/1: see Art. 1(2)(b)). 
147 Supra, text to nn 4-7. 
148 A point which has been emphasised by David Skeel: see D.A. Skeel, ‘Rethinking the Line Between 
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1994) 72 Tex L Rev 471; ‘Corporate Anatomy Lessons’ 
(2004) 113 Yale LJ 1519, 1550-62. See also Armour and Whincop, supra n 6, 25. 
149 See D.A. Skeel, ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1998) 51 Vand 
LR 1325; J. Armour et al, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Corporate Bankruptcy 
Law: Lessons from the UK’ (2002) 55 Vand L Rev 1699. 
  39associated corporate insolvency law. This in turn leads on to the second question: to what 
extent might it be possible for regulatory arbitrage—and thence competition—to take 
place in relation to rules of insolvency law? In this regard, it will be suggested—contrary 
to the popular perception—that the EIR’s scheme could indeed permit a significant and 
valuable degree of regulatory competition.  
 
IS INSOLVENCY LAW A CONSTRAINT ON COMPANY LAW ARBITRAGE? 
To prepare the way for the discussion that follows, it is first necessary to give an 
overview of the EIR’s operation. The Regulation establishes uniform rules for 
jurisdiction and choice of law in relation to international insolvencies occurring within 
the EU, and provides for their automatic recognition by the courts of other Member 
States.
150 Choice of law largely follows the allocation of jurisdiction, so that the lex 
concursus (law of the jurisdiction where insolvency proceedings are opened) will govern 
most of the effects of the proceedings, both procedural and substantive.
151 Thus the rules 
concerning the allocation of jurisdiction are fundamental. 
The EIR’s jurisdiction-allocation scheme has two tracks. The first provides that 
‘main’ proceedings shall be opened in the jurisdiction in which the debtor’s ‘centre of 
main interests’ (‘COMI’) is located.
152 Main proceedings are to have universal effect 
throughout the EU, except and insofar as a territorial ‘carve-out’ created by the second 
track is utilised. This provides that ‘secondary’ proceedings may be opened in any 
Member State (other than that of the COMI) in which the debtor has an 
                                                 
150 See generally, I.F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 
246-301; G. Moss et al, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Oxford: OUP, 2002); M. Martinez 
Ferber, European Insolvency Regulation (Osterspai: Ditmar Weis, 2004); P. Omar, European Insolvency 
Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
151 Reg. 1346/2000, Preamble para 23, Art. 4(2). To this principle there are a number of ‘carve outs’, 
including the effects of insolvency on: (i) rights in rem, reservation of title claims, contracts relating to 
immoveables and rights of third-party purchasers of such assets (each governed by the lex situs: Arts. 5, 7, 
8 and 14); (ii) rights of set-off (governed by the law applicable to the insolvent debtor’s claim: Art. 6); (iii) 
contracts of employment (governed by the proper law of the contract: Art. 10) and (iv) rights subject to 
registration (governed by the law of the place of the register: Art. 11).  
152 Ibid., Art. 3(1). 
  40‘establishment’.
153 Any such secondary proceedings are limited in their effect to the 
territory of the Member State in which they are opened and must be conducted in 
cooperation with the main proceedings.
154 Main proceedings may encompass either 
liquidation (that is, the sale of the debtor’s assets and distribution of proceeds amongst 
creditors) or ‘corporate rescue’ (that is, a ‘crisis governance’ procedure seeking to 
preserve the company or its business from failure) proceedings. In contrast, secondary 
proceedings may only involve liquidation of local assets.
155 Table 4 summarises the key 
features of the foregoing discussion. 
 
Table 4: Summary of the EIR’s scheme 
 
 
 
Main proceedings  Secondary proceedings 
Scope 
 
Universal (EU-wide)  Territorial 
Type of procedure 
 
Rescue or liquidation Liquidation  only 
Jurisdiction allocation 
 
COMI  Place(s) of establishment(s) 
 
We shall now consider whether the EIR’s jurisdiction allocation scheme conforms 
to the ‘real seat’ or the incorporation theory. Given the centrality of the concept of the 
debtor’s COMI to the scheme’s operation, it is most unfortunate that its definition is 
shrouded in ambiguity, reflecting an ugly drafting compromise between Member States’ 
preferences as between these two theories.
156 Thus, the preamble to the EIR provides that 
the COMI shall ‘correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of 
his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.’
157 On the 
                                                 
153 Ibid., Art. 3(2). 
154 Ibid., Arts. 16, 17, 27. 
155 Compare ibid., Annex A (proceedings which may be opened in COMI, including corporate rescue 
procedures) with Annex B (secondary proceedings, including only liquidation procedures). Both Annexes 
have recently been amended by EC Regulation 603/2005 [2005] OJ L 100/1. 
156 See Fletcher, supra n 150; 260-62; Omar, supra n 150, 97-9. 
157 Reg. 1346/2000, Preamble para. 13. 
  41other hand, Article 3(1) raises a presumption in the case of corporate debtors that the 
COMI is the place of the registered office. The uncertainty concerns the degree of 
strength that should be accorded to this presumption. Member States’ jurisprudence—
even in the UK—has to date tended to treat the presumption as easily rebutted by factual 
evidence concerning where the debtor conducted business.
158 Thus, as currently 
interpreted in national caselaw,
159 the notion of COMI conforms more to the real seat 
than the incorporation theory. Moreover, it is clear that even if a corporate debtor’s 
COMI were not in the jurisdiction of its ‘real seat’, the debtor would nevertheless 
certainly have an ‘establishment’ there, so that secondary proceedings could be opened.  
It follows that if a company is incorporated in Member State A, but carries on all 
its business in Member State B, then creditors who lend to it in Member State B can be 
assured that the insolvency law of Member State B will apply, at the very least to assets 
situated in that jurisdiction. This leads some commentators to suggest that corporate 
insolvency law should be treated as falling outside the scope of the regulatory 
competition recently ushered in by the ECJ.
160 If this view, which we might term the 
‘partition theory’, were correct, it would follow that Member States wishing to preserve 
restrictive creditor protection rules should simply transfer them from ‘company’ to 
‘insolvency’ sections of their civil codes. The only limit to such recycling would be a 
casuistic determination whether the rules in question were properly characterised as 
‘company law’ or ‘insolvency law’.
161 The unappealing implications of this analysis may 
                                                 
158 See Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd [2004] BPIR 30 at [16]-[17] (‘where the debtor enters into the majority of his 
financing arrangements’); see also Re BRAC Rent-A-CarInternational, Inc. [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128, [2003] 
1 WLR 1421 at [4]-[5]. For a thorough survey of other Member States’ jurisprudence, see Martinez Ferber, 
supra n 150, 31-74. 
159 This understanding is questioned infra, text to nn 168-171. 
160 See, e.g., Kersting and Schindler, supra n 42, 1290; T. Koller, ‘The English Limited Company—Ready 
to Invade Germany’ (2004) 15 ICCLR 334, 341-3; Martinez Ferber, supra n 150; 86-111; Rammeloo, 
supra n 42, 403-6; Zimmer, supra n 42, 1137-8.  
161 There is some relevant ECJ jurisprudence, albeit directed to the sibling question of the scope of the 
exclusion from the Brussels Convention for ‘insolvency proceedings’ (supra,  n 146). In Gourdain  v. 
Nadler (Case C-133/78, [1979] I ECR 733), the ECJ held that the French action en comblement du passif 
(loosely: failure by directors to take steps to initiate insolvency proceedings sufficiently quickly) was 
  42be seen by considering its application to the issues in Inspire Art. As will be recalled, that 
case concerned the application of the Dutch WFBV or ‘law applicable to formally foreign 
companies’, under which companies operating in the Netherlands but with only a 
nominal connection to their jurisdiction of incorporation were required to comply with 
minimum capital requirements consistent with those imposed upon companies 
incorporated domestically. Were the partition theory valid, then it could plausibly be 
argued that the WFBV’s impact could be preserved by enacting an ‘insolvency version’ 
of the statute.
162 That is, to legislate that should a company that failed the relevant 
capitalisation requirements enter insolvency proceedings, the liquidator should have an 
action to make the directors liable to contribute the ‘missing capital’ for the benefit of the 
company’s creditors.
163 
The better view is that the impact of Inspire Art cannot be constrained in the way 
suggested by the partition theory.
164 The EIR does not purport to govern the content of 
insolvency laws, merely the connecting factor for choice of jurisdiction and choice of 
law. The ECJ’s judgment in Inspire Art is framed not in terms of connecting factors in 
company law, but of legal provisions that impede corporate freedom of establishment. 
Why should this apply any differently to rules formally characterised as ‘corporate 
insolvency law’ than to rules of ‘company law’? The correct question, after Inspire Art, is 
not whether a rule is properly taxonomised as ‘company’ or ‘insolvency’, but rather 
whether its effect is to impede the exercise of corporate freedom of establishment, subject 
of course to the exception for provisions which satisfy the four-stage Gebhard test.
165  
                                                                                                                                                 
properly characterised as part of insolvency proceedings, on the ground that the action was open only to the 
liquidator, and that the proceeds went to enlarge the assets available to the creditors. 
162 As the Dutch legislature appear to have attempted: see Rammeloo, supra n 42, 407-8 and Lowry, supra 
n 42, 343 fn32. 
163 It would be at least arguable that such a provision could be brought within the ECJ’s characterisation of 
‘insolvency proceedings’ in Gourdain v. Nadler: see supra n 161. 
164 A point also made by Kieninger, supra n 3, 752-4. 
165 This can also be seen by considering the tax cases: in de Lastreyie du Saillant (supra n 52), the Court 
ruled that tax laws impeding individuals’ freedom of establishment would be struck down; the reason for 
not so ruling in Daily Mail (supra n 46) was on the basis of the court’s peculiar conception of the ‘status’ of 
a company as governed by the provisions of its state of incorporation: see supra, text to nn 45-46. 
  43Whether a rule that is characterised as part of the host state’s ‘insolvency law’ 
would fail this test will depend upon the impact that (non-) compliance would have on 
the shareholders and/or directors of a foreign company that wishes to establish its 
business in that state. In terms of the ECJ’s freedom of establishment jurisprudence, a 
rule that has such an effect which is more than ‘indirect and uncertain’ will fail this 
test.
166 It is the nature of insolvency proceedings that they only take place if the debtor is 
unable to pay their debts. Assuming that the company is solvent at the point it wishes to 
establish itself in the host state, most rules which operate in insolvency would be likely to 
be no more than ‘indirect and uncertain’ in their impact on the company’s establishment 
decision, because of the small probability that they would ever apply.
167 Yet there are 
situations where the impact might be more direct. The most obvious would be where the 
insolvency code imposes retrospective liability for actions (not) taken during the period 
of the company’s existence which go beyond the obligations imposed by the home state 
company law during solvency and are excessive compared to the requirements of the 
debtor’s home state. It seems that re-enacting the WFBV as ‘insolvency law’ would be 
precisely such a situation. It is not difficult to see that in such a case, shareholders and 
directors of companies such as Inpsire Art Ltd would be deterred from establishing their 
company in the host state because of the risk that, had they failed to capitalise it in 
accordance with the WFBV, they would face concomitant liability to contribute to its 
assets in insolvency. They could only safely avoid such potential liability by incurring a 
significant cost at the time of (re)establishment. In contrast, insolvency liabilities for 
(in)actions immediately preceding entry to insolvency proceedings—such as, for 
example, for wrongful trading—would be unlikely to have a direct and certain impact, 
because they would only be incurred in relation to (in)actions during the ‘twilight period’, 
which would be no more than a distant possibility at the time of (re)establishment. 
 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemerg [1993] ECR I-1663; Case C-190/98, Graf v. 
Filzmoser Mashinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493; Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Deliège v. Ligue 
Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associées ASBL [2000] ECR I-2549. 
167 This point is hinted at by Tröger, supra n 3, __.  
  44COULD REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW BE 
POSSIBLE? 
The foregoing discussion suggests that insolvency law is capable of imposing only an 
indirect constraint on arbitrage (and hence competition) for company law. We now turn 
to the second question: that is, whether regulatory competition in relation to corporate 
insolvency law itself would be feasible within the EU. Given the EIR’s scheme, the 
answer will turn upon the proper interpretation of the notion of COMI. If this were tightly 
bound to a company’s registered office, then a company which was registered in Member 
State A but which had its real seat in Member State B would thereby be able to engage in 
some arbitrage over corporate insolvency law as well as company law. However, the 
EIR’s two-track scheme imposes an outer boundary on the extent to which such arbitrage 
would be possible. This is because, even if the company’s COMI is in Member State A, 
the corporate insolvency law of Member State B will still be available for secondary 
proceedings conducted in that jurisdiction. The choice of COMI will therefore matter 
primarily for (i) the availability, and nature, of any corporate rescue proceedings (because 
the secondary proceedings under Member State B will be limited to liquidation); and (ii) 
the insolvency law rules applicable in third countries.  
It is not implausible, notwithstanding the prevailing view in the national caselaw, 
that a corporate debtor’s COMI could be interpreted as tightly bound to its registered 
office. As the concept is a creature of EC legislation, it will bear an autonomous meaning 
in European law. The ECJ has been called to rule upon the application of COMI in the 
pending case of Bondi.
168 There are good reasons for suggesting that the Court should 
treat the presumption created by Article 3(1), that a corporate debtor’s COMI shall 
ordinarily be the state of its registered office, as a strong one. According to the Virgos-
Schmidt Report, the unofficial interpretive guide to the Regulation, insolvency is a 
foreseeable risk to creditors, and therefore that it is important that the jurisdiction in 
insolvency be one which they are able to predict easily.
169 A priori, it is hard to see how a 
                                                 
168 C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of America NA; application for urgent decision under the accelerated procedure 
refused, 15.09.2004. 
169 M. Virgos and E. Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (reprinted in Moss et al. 
(eds.), supra n 150, Appendix 2), para 75.  
  45test based on where business is in fact conducted renders creditors of international 
businesses more certain as to where insolvency proceedings will be conducted than a rule 
based on state of incorporation. This point is strengthened when it is borne in mind that 
local creditors will in any event be protected by the possibility of territorial secondary 
proceedings in any jurisdiction where business is carried on. Where a debtor conducts 
substantial business activities in more than one jurisdiction, the registered office will 
often be easier to determine than where the majority of the debtor’s financial 
arrangements were conducted. What is worse, a purely geographic connecting factor is 
subject to change simply by the physical movement of the debtor, with the possibility that 
a transfer may be effected to a ‘debtor-friendly’ jurisdiction on the eve of insolvency.
170 
In contrast, tying COMI to the place of registered office would be readily 
ascertainable by creditors even where business is conducted in more than one state. 
Moreover, because the registered office is a legal rather than a geographic matter, 
corporate debtors could be prevented from ‘switching COMI’ to the detriment of their 
creditors through the simple expedient of a rule banning changes of registered office in 
contemplation of insolvency.
171 Most fundamentally, even in cases where such particular 
problems do not arise, equating COMI with registered office would promote certainty 
amongst creditors at least as well as the geographic location of business test in a day and 
age when all that is required to determine the relevant information is an internet search.  
 
WOULD REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IN CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW BE 
DESIRABLE?  
Were COMI interpreted in accordance with these suggestions, it would then become 
possible for companies to select the law which would govern any main insolvency 
proceedings in the same way as they can (or in the case of established companies, soon 
                                                 
170 See Skjevesland v. Geveran Trading Co Ltd [2003] BPIR 924 at [4]; Shierson v. Vlieland-Boddy [2004] 
EWHC 2752 (Ch), [2004] All ER (D) 420 at [13]-[23], esp. at [21]: ‘[T]he creditors are always at risk of 
such a change [of COMI], and they cannot safely make any assumptions as to the insolvency law which 
will apply in due course.’ (per Mann J).  
171 Such a rule would, on this paper’s analysis, be a good candidate for EU legislation as a ‘procedural 
harmonization’ provision. 
  46will be able to) do in respect of their company laws. It might be objected that having the 
law of Member State A (the home state) govern insolvency proceedings is impractical 
when the debtor’s assets and business are located in Member State B (the host state). Yet 
it should be recalled that secondary proceedings could be opened in the host state. Rather, 
the only significant question which would be determined in this case by the COMI would 
be the availability, and nature of, any corporate rescue proceedings.  
More fundamentally, it might be feared that permitting arbitrage over choice of 
insolvency law will lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, with companies incorporating in 
jurisdictions with weak insolvency laws so as to be able to benefit shareholders at the 
expense of creditors. To understand this, it is helpful to segment creditors into ‘adjusting’ 
and ‘non-adjusting’ categories.
172 The objection focuses upon the perceived plight of 
non-adjusting creditors—that is, those parties who extend ‘credit’ involuntarily (the 
paradigm case being tort victims), or in such small amounts that the transaction costs of 
becoming informed and adjusting their positions outweigh the benefits of doing so. The 
argument would assert that many Member States’ insolvency regimes contain 
mechanisms designed to protect such creditors,
173 and that permitting companies to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage would allow them to undermine this protection.
174 Were 
this possible, shareholders would be able to benefit themselves at the expense of such 
creditors by selecting an insolvency law that would offer minimal protection. If this were 
unchecked, then it would clearly be an example of a ‘race to the bottom’. 
    Yet such an outcome would not eventuate. First, under the EIR’s scheme, 
insolvency priority rules designed to protect nonadjusting creditors would in any event be 
available to them through territorial proceedings in the jurisdiction in which they claim. 
                                                 
172 The terminology is derived from L.A. Bebchuk and J.M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 857. The possibility that the presence of nonadjusting 
might distort firms’ investment incentives so as to exploit them was first noted in  J.H. Scott, Jr., 
‘Bankruptcy, Secured Debt and Optimal Capital Structure’ (1979) 32 J Fin 1. 
173 For example, the ‘prescribed part’ of floating charge assets which must be set aside for unsecured 
creditors in UK corporate insolvencies following the Enterprise Act 2002: see Insolvency Act 1986, s 
176A. 
174 See, e.g., L. LoPucki, ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach’ (1999) 
84 Cornell L Rev 696, 720-23. 
  47Thus they will be made no worse off by permitting regulatory arbitrage over corporate 
rescue proceedings. Secondly, vulnerable creditors can be protected more effectively and 
precisely by mechanisms other than the re-ordering of priorities in insolvency.
175 If such 
regulatory requirements constituted prima facie restrictions on freedom of establishment, 
there seems little doubt that carefully-targeted provisions would satisfy the requirements 
of the Gebhard formula to be justified in the overriding public interest. 
Thus, the limited regulatory arbitrage which the EIR could permit over insolvency 
law would not impose costs on non-adjusting creditors. Not only would it not harm these 
groups, but it would also bring significant benefits. To understand these, it is necessary to 
consider the way in which sophisticated—‘adjusting’—creditors might be expected to 
respond to such arbitrage.
176 The could be expected to adjust the terms of their credit 
transaction to reflect the effect of a debtor’s choice of COMI. Where this is harmful to 
such creditors, the debtor will incur a higher cost of credit, or find it difficult to raise 
credit at all. Where the regime leaves gaps, such creditors may be expected to contract for 
protection in the form of loan covenants, security interests, and the like. If the costs of 
such contracting are high, then the debtor will have an incentive to select an insolvency 
regime which creditors would prefer. Member States wishing to attract, or not to deter, 
companies would respond by providing insolvency codes that offer the appropriate 
protection: regulatory competition resulting in a ‘race to the top’, rather than to the 
bottom. 
As we have seen, the choice of COMI will matter, from creditors’ point of view, 
principally in regard to corporate rescue proceedings. There are reasons for thinking that 
this area is one in which the operation of regulatory competition would be particularly 
                                                 
175 For tort victims and environmental claims, mandatory insurance or statutory guarantee requirements for 
those engaging in hazardous activities provide clearly-targeted incentives. For unsophisticated voluntary 
creditors, such as consumers, employees and trade creditors, credit insurance can be provided—either 
through statutory mandate or by market providers—by sophisticated creditors who then price the risk into 
their transactions with the debtor. 
176 A.T. Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defence of Universalism’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2177, 
2180-81.   
  48fruitful.
177 The extent to which a legal regime should seek to foster ‘rescue’ of troubled 
companies, and the way in which control of the distressed company should be organised 
therein, are highly contentious matters. A vocal group of US scholars has argued that 
debtors should be permitted to design their own insolvency regimes by contract with their 
creditors, as opposed to being able to participate only in mandatory state-sanctioned 
insolvency procedures.
178 Permitting regulatory competition over insolvency laws would 
be an approximation to this result, with the added benefit that each regime on the ‘menu’ 
from which debtors could select would come with a ready-made body of case law 
interpreting and applying it, enabling the market to assess the likely consequences with 
confidence. Moreover, to the extent that corporate rescue regimes complement other 
aspects of a corporate governance system, permitting firms to opt into these as well as the 
other parts of the regime will further promote specialisation if this is indeed the direction 
taken by European regulatory competition. Thus corporate rescue procedures seem a 
prime candidate for a stance of regulatory agnosticism at the EU level, and for the forces 
of regulatory competition to be harnessed so as to permit a learning process as to the most 
appropriate legal regime. 
To recapitulate: permitting regulatory arbitrage over corporate insolvency law to 
the extent which it could take place within the EIR framework would be a desirable step. 
The structure of the EIR means that it would principally affect the availability, and form 
of, any corporate rescue proceedings. This is a matter which adjusting creditors can be 
expected to take into account in pricing the firm’s cost of credit, thereby forcing firms to 
internalise the impact of insolvency on creditors in their arbitrage decisions.
179 The 
position of non-adjusting creditors would be protected through territorial measures which 
                                                 
177 See Skeel, ‘Rethinking the Line’, supra n 148, 517-23. 
178 See, e.g., R.K. Rasmussen, ‘Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’, (1992) 71 
Tex L Rev 51; A. Schwartz, ‘Contracting About Bankruptcy’, (1997) 13 J L Econ & Org 127. The 
argument is extended to the context of international insolvencies in R.K. Rasmussen, ‘A New Approach to 
Transnational Insolvencies’ (1997) 19 Mich J Int’l L 1. 
179 This would be the case both for formation and reincorporation choices, as adjusting creditors could 
easily include loan covenants specifying that reincorporation without their consent would constitute an 
event of default. 
  49are either given effect to in secondary proceedings, or which are necessary and 
proportionate in their impact—thus satisfying the Gebhard test. The EIR’s jurisdictional-
allocation scheme, if COMI is interpreted in accordance with the argument of this paper, 
would thus act as a form of procedural harmonisation in corporate insolvency law, so as 
to guide the process of the development of insolvency laws towards beneficial regulatory 
competition. The availability of secondary proceedings truncates the possibilities for a 
‘race to the bottom’, leaving only opportunities for a ‘race to the top’ over corporate 
rescue proceedings.
180 Member States’ regulatory responses could be expected to follow 
a pattern of mutual learning, permitting a beneficial evolution and the ultimate adoption 
of the most appropriate corporate rescue regimes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The question this paper set out to address was whether European corporate law would in 
future best be made by ‘federal’ legislation or regulatory competition between Member 
States. As EC legislation carries with it well-known problems, the answer to the question 
depends on an assessment of the prospects for European regulatory competition in the 
field. If regulatory competition would be pathological, then EC legislation might be 
justified as a ‘lesser evil’. Therefore, although ‘crystal ball gazing’ is a risky activity, I 
have sought—perhaps recklessly—to offer a view of the likely future development of 
European regulatory competition.  
  My conclusions on regulatory competition are largely sanguine. It seems plausible 
that regulatory competition will come to be a motor for the development of Member 
States’ company laws and corporate governance systems. Arbitrage by ‘start-up’ firms is 
already legally possible, and this is starting to lead to responsive changes throughout 
Europe in laws applicable to private companies. For established companies, arbitrage will 
in all likelihood soon be facilitated by European legislation, in the form of the Tenth and 
Fourteenth Company Law Directives. This will not be attractive to all companies, 
                                                 
180 The structure is designed to protect local creditors, but not to permit them to stymie rescue proceedings. 
Thus the insolvency practitioner conducting main proceedings is empowered to stay secondary proceedings 
so as to effect a rescue, provided that adequate protection is offered for the interests of creditors in the 
secondary proceedings: Reg. 1346/2000, Art. 33. 
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systems. However, it seems plausible that the UK, with a governance system adapted to 
dispersed ownership, will be an attractive destination for companies whose owners wish 
to exit blockholdings and shift to dispersed ownership. This process will be facilitated by 
the newly pan-European law firms. Hence the UK’s professional services sector has a 
powerful incentive to ensure that the governance regime—most especially, the self-
regulatory aspects—is kept attractive to firms thinking about moving there. Other 
Member States, faced with this apparent challenge, are likely to respond by ‘defensive’ 
regulatory competition. Precisely how this will develop is unclear, but it seems plausible 
that a likely strategy would be to enhance further those aspects of their systems which 
will complement firms with concentrated ownership. This would yield a process of path-
dependent specialisation, rather than convergence.  
  Underpinning this process will be EC legislation governing how established firms 
will be able to make their reincorporation decisions. This ‘procedural’ regulation will 
ensure that affected constituencies are parties to the decision-making process, and so 
transfers of jurisdiction motivated by a desire to expropriate them will not succeed. This 
will remove the prospect of a detrimental ‘race to the bottom’. 
  Some Member States may seek to recharacterise creditor protection rules as part 
of their corporate insolvency codes, but the better view is that this will not insulate them 
from the possibility of being held to constitute unlawful impediments to corporate 
freedom of establishment. Indeed, perhaps my most radical suggestion is that the 
framework of the European Insolvency Regulation could actually permit a certain amount 
of arbitrage—and thence competition—over corporate rescue proceedings. As the 
relevant rules may complement other aspects of corporate law, it seems desirable that 
they should be subject to a similar process of development. 
  A positive assessment of regulatory competition makes the drawbacks of 
harmonized EC legislation all the more stark. Harmonized legislation runs two risks 
which are avoided by a process of benign regulatory competition. First, such legislation 
tends to encourage Member States to converge their laws on a central model, which may 
be inappropriate where one ‘size’ does not ‘fit’ all. Decentralised solutions can permit 
Member States to continue patterns of diversity, whilst regulatory arbitrage allows 
  51individual firms for which the national model is inappropriate to opt out. Secondly, 
harmonization presupposes that the European legislator is able to specify the ‘best’ 
regulatory solution to any given problem. In an area such as company law, where the 
configuration of the optimal rules is hotly debated, regulatory competition can promote 
innovation and mutual learning between national legislatures.  
In conclusion, then, the answer to our starting question is that the future of 
European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the 
form of European legislation, save for areas in which a uniform consensus has emerged 
regarding the appropriate regulatory choice. This does not seem inconsistent with the 
thinking behind the European Commission’s recent Company Law Action Plan, which 
recognises the benefits of national diversity and proposes EC legislation only in certain 
limited areas. It is to be hoped that time will be permitted to demonstrate the soundness 
of this approach. 
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